Publish Tax Gap and Evasion Convictions

Summary#

This bill changes the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) reporting rules. It requires the CRA to list all tax evasion convictions in its annual report and to publish “tax gap” statistics every three years. It also requires the Minister of National Revenue to share the underlying tax gap data with the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO), under existing confidentiality rules (Bill s.88(2)(c.1), s.88(3), s.88.1(1)-(4)).

• Lists every conviction for tax evasion in the CRA’s annual report, with a separate list for international tax evasion (Bill s.88(2)(c.1)).
• Defines “tax gap” and requires the government to measure and publish it every three years (Bill s.88(3), s.88.1(1)-(2)).
• Breaks tax gap data out by taxpayer type: individuals, corporations by size, and trusts resident in Canada (Bill s.88.1(2)).
• Requires the Minister to give the PBO the tax gap data for independent analysis, under confidentiality provisions (Bill s.88.1(3)-(4)).
• Does not change tax rates, penalties, audits, or who owes tax; it changes reporting and data sharing only (Bill text).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • No change to your tax rates, benefits, filing steps, or deadlines. This is a reporting and transparency bill (Bill text).
  • If a person is convicted of tax evasion, their conviction will be listed in the CRA’s annual report; international cases will appear in a separate list (Bill s.88(2)(c.1)).
  • Public tax gap statistics will show the size of unpaid federal income tax across groups every three years, with a three‑year data lag (Bill s.88(3), s.88.1(2)).

• Businesses and trusts

  • No change to business tax rates or filing rules (Bill text).
  • Convictions for tax evasion will be listed publicly in the CRA annual report, including for corporations and trusts; international evasion is listed separately (Bill s.88(2)(c.1)).
  • Tax gap data will be segmented by corporation size and by trusts, which may inform future compliance focus (Bill s.88.1(2)).

• Tax professionals and researchers

  • Access to standardized tax gap statistics and definitions, updated every three years, may aid analysis and client advice (Bill s.88(3), s.88.1(1)-(2)).
  • The PBO will receive underlying data for deeper analysis, subject to confidentiality rules (Bill s.88.1(3)-(4)).

• Parliament and the public

  • Greater transparency on tax evasion convictions and unpaid tax estimates may support oversight and policy debate (Bill s.88(2)(c.1), s.88(3), s.88.1(2)-(4)).

• Timing

  • The conviction list applies to the CRA’s annual report after the law takes effect (Bill s.88(2)(c.1)).
  • The first tax gap statistics must appear in the annual report for the year that is three years after the law takes effect, and will cover the fiscal year that ended three years before that report (Bill s.88(3)).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No direct appropriations, fees, or tax changes are in the bill text (Bill text).
• CRA must collect, compile, analyze, and publish tax gap statistics every three years and list convictions annually; costs are not estimated (Bill s.88(2)(c.1), s.88(3), s.88.1(2)).
• The Minister must transmit tax gap data to the PBO under confidentiality provisions; any IT or staffing costs are not provided (Bill s.88.1(3)-(4)).
• Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Transparency deters evasion: Publishing all tax evasion convictions, with a separate international list, increases public accountability and may discourage evasion (Bill s.88(2)(c.1)).
• Regular, standardized tax gap reporting improves oversight: A clear definition and triennial reporting cycle give Parliament and the public a consistent view of unpaid tax over time (Bill s.88(3), s.88.1(1)-(2)).
• Better targeting: Breaking out tax gap estimates by individuals, corporations by size, and trusts can help focus compliance efforts where the gap is largest (Bill s.88.1(2)).
• Independent analysis: Giving the PBO access to tax gap data allows an arm’s‑length check on methods and results, while applying existing confidentiality rules (Bill s.88.1(3)-(4)).
• International focus: A distinct list of international tax evasion highlights cross‑border non‑compliance, including issues like unreported foreign property (Bill s.88(2)(c.1), s.88.1(1)(d)).

Opponents' View#

• Administrative burden without clear payoff: New data collection, analysis, and reporting requirements may add costs and staff time at CRA and the PBO, with no guaranteed revenue increase (Bill s.88(3), s.88.1(2)-(3)). Assumes added workload; cost data unavailable.
• Data quality and interpretation risks: Estimating a tax gap involves audit-based assumptions about undetected errors and collectability that can be imprecise or misread by the public (Bill s.88.1(1)(a)-(c)). Assumes measurement uncertainty.
• Lag reduces usefulness: A three‑year reporting lag may limit how quickly Parliament or CRA can act on findings (Bill s.88(3)).
• Privacy and confidentiality concerns: Although existing protections apply, expanding datasets shared with the PBO could increase the risk of improper disclosure if safeguards fail (Bill s.88.1(3)-(4)). Assumes some residual risk.
• Reputational impacts: Publicly listing convictions could extend penalties through reputational harm beyond the court sentence, which some may view as disproportionate. Assumes reputational effects; data unavailable.