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Québec to Create Independent Budget Watchdog

Full Title: Budget Officer Act

Summary#

  • This bill creates an independent Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) for Québec. The goal is to give the National Assembly clear, non‑partisan analysis of public finances, the budget, and the economy.

  • The PBO would publish regular reports on the state of Québec’s finances, certify the government’s pre‑election fiscal report, and estimate the cost of proposals from Members of the National Assembly (MNAs).

  • Key changes:

    • Sets up a 7‑year, non‑renewable, full‑time PBO appointed by a two‑thirds vote of the Assembly.
    • Requires an annual outlook on the economy and finances, at least twice‑yearly updates on public finances, and a report every three years on intergenerational fairness over a 40‑year horizon.
    • Transfers the pre‑election fiscal “certification” from the Auditor General to the new PBO.
    • Lets MNAs request confidential cost estimates for proposed measures; the MNA can later ask the PBO to publish the results.
    • Gives the PBO strong access to government data and protections to work independently.

What it means for you#

  • Residents and taxpayers

    • More plain‑language reports on how Québec’s money is raised and spent.
    • A clearer picture of long‑term challenges, like aging, technology, and climate, and how they could affect services and taxes.
    • More transparency before elections about whether budget forecasts are realistic.
  • Voters

    • Independent checks on pre‑election numbers, which can help you compare parties’ claims.
    • Public briefings that explain the state of the province’s finances in simple terms.
  • Members of the National Assembly (MNAs)

    • Ability to ask the PBO to estimate the cost of a proposed policy or spending idea. The request stays confidential unless you ask the PBO to release it.
    • Regular, non‑partisan analysis to support budget debates and committee work.
  • Journalists, researchers, and civil society

    • A steady stream of independent data and analysis to inform public debate.
    • Access to long‑term assessments of debt sustainability and impacts across generations.
  • Government ministries and public bodies

    • Must share requested data, studies, and explanations with the PBO and, when needed, host PBO staff on site.
    • Added workload to provide information on timelines tied to regular and pre‑election reports.

Expenses#

  • No publicly available information.

Proponents' View#

  • Improves transparency and accountability by putting clear, independent numbers in the public domain.
  • Strengthens budget discipline with regular checks on long‑term debt sustainability and intergenerational fairness.
  • Helps MNAs craft better policies by providing neutral cost estimates and analysis on request.
  • Builds public trust before elections by independently certifying the government’s fiscal forecasts.
  • Aligns Québec with best practices seen in other jurisdictions that use independent fiscal offices.

Opponents' View#

  • Creates a new office that will cost money to set up and staff, with no clear savings identified.
  • Adds reporting and data‑sharing demands on ministries, which could strain capacity or slow work.
  • Shifts a pre‑election review role away from the Auditor General, raising questions about duplication or overlap.
  • Broad data‑access powers may raise privacy or confidentiality concerns, even with safeguards.
  • Appointment by political leaders, even with a supermajority requirement, could still prompt concerns about perceived independence.

Timeline

Mar 14, 2024

Présentation

Economics