CSIS Must Report Candour Breaches Annually

Summary#

This bill amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to increase transparency about CSIS’s “duty of candour” to the courts (the duty to fully and frankly share all relevant facts when seeking warrants). It requires CSIS to track and report breaches of that duty and to include a general description in its annual public report. It also updates the oath for the CSIS Director and employees to explicitly include the duty of candour.

• Requires CSIS to record the number of times it has or may have breached its duty of candour in warrant applications, with a description and remedial steps (Bill s.6(7)).
• Requires an annual report to the Minister within 3 months after year‑end, and tabling in Parliament, including a general description of these breaches (Bill s.20.2).
• Updates the oath of office to include “duties owed to the courts, such as the duty of candour” (Bill Schedule – Oath).
• Does not change warrant powers or court procedures; it adds reporting and an oath change only (Bill s.6(7), s.20.2; Schedule).
• Effective date not specified in the bill text.

What it means for you#

• Households and civil society

  • You will see more information in CSIS’s annual public report about court‑related disclosure problems, in general terms, after each calendar year (Bill s.20.2).
  • No direct change to your legal rights or CSIS’s investigative powers. The change is about transparency and internal accountability (Bill s.6(7), s.20.2).

• Parliament and oversight audiences

  • Parliament will receive, within the first 15 sitting days after the Minister receives it, an annual report that includes a general description of duty‑of‑candour breaches and remedial actions (Bill s.20.2).
  • Potential for more focused committee scrutiny using the new reporting categories (Bill s.6(7), s.20.2).

• Courts and legal community

  • The bill does not alter the legal standard for warrants or court procedures. It seeks to reduce future disclosure failures through reporting and culture change (Bill s.6(7); Schedule – Oath).

• CSIS employees and leadership

  • The Director and employees will take a revised oath that expressly commits them to the duty of candour to the courts (Bill Schedule – Oath).
  • CSIS must track and describe each instance it has or may have breached the duty of candour in warrant applications, and note remedial measures taken (Bill s.6(7)).

• Timing and scope

  • Annual cycle: covers the prior calendar year; report due to the Minister within 3 months after year‑end; public tabling shortly after (Bill s.20.2).
  • The bill does not specify a delayed implementation date.

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• Fiscal note: Data unavailable.
• Explicit appropriations in the bill: None.
• Mandated activities that may carry costs:
  • Internal tracking and review of potential and confirmed breaches (Bill s.6(7)) — Data unavailable.
  • Preparation of annual report content and public “general description” (Bill s.20.2) — Data unavailable.
  • Oath update and any related training or administrative changes — Data unavailable.
• New fees or revenues: None identified in the bill.

Proponents' View#

• Improves transparency and accountability by requiring counts, descriptions, and remedial actions for duty‑of‑candour breaches related to warrant applications (Bill s.6(7)).
• Enhances public reporting while protecting sensitive details, since the tabled report includes only a “general description” for Parliament and the public (Bill s.20.2).
• Strengthens compliance culture by embedding the duty of candour in the oath for the Director and all employees, signaling clear expectations (Bill Schedule – Oath).
• Helps Parliament monitor whether CSIS is fixing problems through the mandated disclosure of remedial measures (Bill s.6(7)).
• The “has or may have breached” wording encourages conservative, fuller reporting, reducing the chance that issues go unreported (Bill s.6(7)).

Opponents' View#

• Risk of operational sensitivity: even “general descriptions” could allow inference about methods or cases, creating security or privacy concerns (Bill s.20.2).
• Implementation burden: tracking “has or may have breached” could require extensive internal reviews and legal vetting, with uncertain costs and staff time (Bill s.6(7)).
• Ambiguity: the threshold for “may have breached” is not defined, which could lead to inconsistent counting and public confusion about the seriousness of incidents (Bill s.6(7)).
• No added enforcement mechanism: the bill adds reporting and an oath change but no penalties or corrective powers, so impact may be limited if compliance practices do not improve (Bill s.6(7); Schedule – Oath).
• Possible duplication: existing oversight and court scrutiny already address disclosure failures; added reporting might overlap without clear benefits (Bill s.6(7), s.20.2).