Summary#

The Countering Foreign Interference Act (Bill C-70) updates national security, criminal, evidence, and transparency laws to deter covert foreign influence. It strengthens Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) powers, creates new criminal offences tied to foreign entities, changes court rules for handling secret information, and sets up a public registry for people acting under arrangements with foreign principals in political processes.

• Requires people who enter certain arrangements with foreign states or their proxies to register within 14 days; creates a public registry and a new Commissioner (Part 4, ss. 5, 8–11).
• Creates new offences for acting “at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with” a foreign entity, including covert political influence; penalties up to life imprisonment (Part 2, ss. 20.2–20.4).
• Expands “sabotage” to cover essential infrastructure, with explicit protection for protest and labour action where there is no intent to cause specified harms; AG consent required to prosecute (Criminal Code ss. 52.1, 52.2; s. 52(5); s. 52.3).
• Gives CSIS new tools (preservation and production orders, single‑attempt warrants; clarified foreign data collection from within Canada), and modernizes dataset rules with judicial and ministerial controls and a 5‑year parliamentary review (Part 1, e.g., ss. 20.3–20.8, 22.21; datasets ss. 11.03–11.25; Review).
• Changes court processes to handle sensitive information, including appointing special counsel and limiting some appeals until after conviction (Part 3, Canada Evidence Act; e.g., s. 37.1(1.1), s. 38.09(1.1)).

What it means for you#

• Households and individuals

  • If you act under an arrangement with a foreign principal to influence or communicate about Canadian political or governmental processes, you must register within 14 days and keep information updated. The registry is public (Part 4, ss. 5, 8).
  • Covert or deceptive conduct done at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, to influence democratic rights or political/governmental processes, can lead to life imprisonment (Part 2, s. 20.4).
  • Intimidation, threats, or violence linked to a foreign entity, including some acts done outside Canada with a Canadian link, carry up to life imprisonment (Part 2, s. 20; s. 20.1).

• Workers, protesters, and organizers

  • New “sabotage — essential infrastructure” offence targets intentional acts that make critical systems unsafe or inoperable. It protects strikes, work stoppages, and advocacy/protest/dissent where there is no intent to cause specified harms (Criminal Code s. 52.1(1), (3)–(5)).
  • Making or distributing a device (including software) for sabotage is an offence (Criminal Code s. 52.2).

• Businesses, platforms, and record holders

  • You may receive a court‑ordered preservation order (keep data for up to 90 days) or a production order (produce specified records) from CSIS. You can apply to vary or revoke a production order within 14 days (Part 1, ss. 20.3–20.5).
  • After orders expire or are executed, you must destroy preserved materials not kept in the ordinary course of business (Part 1, s. 20.8).
  • There is protection from civil/criminal liability for voluntarily preserving or producing information to CSIS when not prohibited by law (Part 1, s. 20.7).

• Public office holders and political actors (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous)

  • Political processes at all levels are within scope of the new political interference offence and the registry regime (Part 2, s. 20.4(5); Part 4, s. 4).
  • Registry obligations for provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous processes start on dates set by Cabinet, not before the main Part 4 start date (Part 4, Coming into Force).

• Universities, school boards, and education sector

  • “Educational governance” (e.g., school boards, colleges, universities) is explicitly covered by the political interference offence (Part 2, s. 20.4(4)).

• People in court proceedings

  • In some cases involving national security information, judges may hear evidence in private, appoint special counsel to protect a non‑government party’s interests, and limit disclosure to summaries. Appeals on certain secrecy rulings are allowed only after conviction unless exceptional circumstances exist (Part 3, e.g., s. 37.1(1.1); s. 38.09(1.1); special counsel provisions).

• Timing

  • Most criminal and evidence changes take effect 60 days after Royal Assent (Part 2, Div. 3; Part 3, Div. 4).
  • The registry and Commissioner take effect on a date set by Cabinet; expansion to non‑federal processes also occurs by order (Part 4, Coming into Force).
  • CSIS Act changes take effect per the Act; the CSIS Act will face a 5‑year parliamentary review (Part 1, Parliamentary Review).

Expenses#

• Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• Key known elements:

  • Royal Recommendation signals new spending authority is required, but the bill sets no dollar amounts (Preamble to Summary).
  • Creates a new Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner with staff, systems, and enforcement capacity (Part 4, ss. 9–14, 16–25).
  • Adds administrative monetary penalties and criminal fines that may generate revenue; amounts of AMPs to be set by regulation (Part 4, ss. 22–25).
  • Additional demands on CSIS, the Federal Court, and the Federal Court of Appeal (e.g., orders, special counsel) with no quantified costs (Part 1; Part 3).

• Fiscal note or PBO estimate: Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Transparency and deterrence: A public registry of arrangements with foreign principals makes influence efforts visible and deters covert activity; registration within 14 days and ongoing updates are mandatory (Part 4, s. 5; s. 8).
• Strong criminal tools: New offences cover committing crimes for foreign entities, deceptive conduct that harms Canadian interests, and political interference tied to foreign entities; penalties up to life imprisonment aim to raise the cost of foreign meddling (Part 2, ss. 20.2–20.4).
• Protest safeguards: The essential‑infrastructure offence includes clear protections for advocacy, protest, and labour action where there is no intent to cause the specified harms; prosecutions require the Attorney General’s consent (Criminal Code s. 52.1(3)–(5); s. 52.3).
• Faster, clearer intelligence powers with oversight: Preservation/production orders and single‑attempt warrants can secure evidence quickly; dataset rules require ministerial/judicial authorization, set retention limits, and delete sensitive information like health data and solicitor‑client privileged material (Part 1, ss. 11.1(1), 11.13, 11.17, 20.3–20.8).
• Protecting secrets while maintaining fairness: Special counsel, summaries, and time‑limited appeals aim to prevent harmful disclosure of national security information while allowing cases to proceed (Part 3; e.g., special counsel; s. 37.1(1.1); s. 38.09(1.1)).

Opponents' View#

• Overbreadth and chilling effects: The registry could capture benign or routine interactions, especially for diaspora groups, academics, or NGOs. Key scope details depend on future regulations (who is a “public office holder,” information to file), creating uncertainty and potential over‑compliance (Part 4, ss. 2, 5–6, 32).
• Vague standards, severe penalties: Terms like “surreptitious or deceptive conduct” and “in association with” a foreign entity are broad. With penalties up to life imprisonment, there is a risk of sweeping in legitimate activity or uneven enforcement (Part 2, s. 20.3; s. 20.4).
• Protest risk at critical sites: “Essential infrastructure” is defined broadly and can be expanded by regulation. Although there are protest and labour safeguards, disputes about intent could expose protesters to investigation (Criminal Code s. 52.1(2), (5), (6)).
• Privacy and due process concerns: CSIS preservation/production orders and voluntary data requests may pressure firms to share information under confidentiality, with limited notice to affected individuals (Part 1, ss. 19(2.1), 20.3–20.7).
• Fair trial concerns: Limiting some appeals on secrecy rulings until after conviction and allowing private, ex parte hearings — with special counsel not acting as the person’s lawyer — may constrain an accused’s ability to test the case against them (Part 3, s. 37.1(1.1); s. 38.09(1.1); special counsel role).
• Implementation risk and cost: The new Commissioner, registry, and court processes require new systems, staff, and rules. Without published cost estimates or timelines for regulations, governments, businesses, and civil society face planning uncertainty (Part 4, ss. 9–14, 32; Coming into Force).