Crackdown on Foreign Repression and Influence

Summary#

This bill updates Canada’s sanctions and broadcasting laws to target human rights abuses, corruption, and “transnational repression” (a foreign state’s intimidation or harm of people abroad). It expands who can be sanctioned, adds visa bans for immediate family of sanctioned people, and requires more transparency from the government. It also bars or revokes broadcasting licences for outlets vulnerable to influence by certain sanctioned or genocidal foreign actors.

• Adds “transnational repression” as a sanctionable ground under both sanctions laws (JVCOFA and SEMA) (JVCOFA s.4 amended; SEMA s.4(1.1) amended).
• Requires the Foreign Affairs Minister to publish an annual human rights report, including a list of “prisoners of conscience,” with safety/privacy safeguards (DFATD Act s.10(4)-(6) as amended).
• Blocks visas for immediate family of sanctioned persons, unless they did not benefit materially or financially (JVCOFA new Immediate family clause; SEMA new Immediate family clause).
• Mandates tabling of each sanctions order with a statement of evidence/criteria, enforcement steps, ally coordination, and number of properties seized or restrained (JVCOFA s.5; SEMA s.7(1)-(1.1)).
• Requires RCMP and FINTRAC to share relevant information with the Minister and sets a 30-day decision window (JVCOFA s.7.2, s.7.21; SEMA s.6.2, s.6.21).
• Bars and requires revocation of CRTC licences for broadcasters vulnerable to significant influence by sanctioned entities or actors recognized by Parliament as having committed genocide (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1), s.24(4)).

What it means for you#

• Households and diaspora communities

  • If you are targeted by a foreign regime in Canada (e.g., threats, stalking), the government could sanction those responsible under the new “transnational repression” ground (JVCOFA s.4; SEMA s.4(1.1) as amended).
  • Families of “prisoners of conscience” may receive more regular updates and outreach as the government must report yearly and describe its communications with families and civil society (DFATD Act s.10(4)(b)-(c)).
  • Immediate family members of sanctioned persons may be refused Canadian visas, unless the Minister believes they did not receive material or financial benefits from the sanctioned person (JVCOFA Immediate family; SEMA Immediate family).

• Viewers and listeners

  • Some foreign-backed channels or distributors could lose existing CRTC licences or be denied renewals if they are vulnerable to influence by sanctioned or genocidal actors; service could end quickly after revocation (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1), s.24(4)).

• Workers and businesses

  • Media and broadcasting firms must assess ownership and influence risks tied to sanctioned or genocidal foreign actors to avoid licence loss (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1), s.24(4)).
  • Companies with exposure to sanctioned persons, entities, or states face higher summary-conviction penalties for SEMA offences: fines up to $100,000 and up to 3 years’ imprisonment (SEMA s.8(a) amended).
  • Property linked to sanctioned targets may be forfeited on a set timeline; authorities must seek forfeiture within 12 months of seizure/restraint and dispose of forfeited property within 30 days (JVCOFA s.4.4; SEMA s.5.6).

• Civil society and parliamentarians

  • Parliamentary committees can recommend sanctions; the Minister must respond with reasons and post the response online, within parliamentary timelines (JVCOFA new “Response to recommendation of committee”).
  • Each sanctions order must be tabled promptly with a statement of evidence/criteria and enforcement actions, increasing transparency (JVCOFA s.5; SEMA s.7(1)-(1.1)).

• Law enforcement and compliance professionals

  • RCMP and FINTRAC must provide relevant information to the Minister when they have reasonable grounds, including based on public tips; the Minister must recommend action to Cabinet within 30 days (JVCOFA s.7.2(3)-(4), s.7.21(2)-(3); SEMA s.6.2(3)-(4), s.6.21(2)-(3)).
  • Sanctions can be aligned with decisions of organizations that include Five Eyes and NATO (SEMA s.4(1.1)(a) amended).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No direct appropriations, taxes, or fees are in the bill text. Data unavailable.
• Likely administrative impacts for Global Affairs Canada (annual report; tabling), RCMP and FINTRAC (information-sharing duties), and the CRTC (licensing reviews). Data unavailable.
• Potential fine revenue increase due to higher SEMA summary penalties. Data unavailable.
• No official fiscal note identified. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Strengthens tools against foreign intimidation of people in Canada by explicitly sanctioning “transnational repression,” covering dissidents, journalists, and diaspora communities (JVCOFA s.2; s.4(2)(e); SEMA s.2; s.4(1.1)(c)).
• Closes loopholes by extending visa ineligibility to immediate family of sanctioned persons, with a safeguard for non-benefiting family members (JVCOFA Immediate family; SEMA Immediate family).
• Increases transparency and parliamentary oversight through mandatory tabling of orders and statements of evidence, ally coordination, and property seizure counts (JVCOFA s.5(1)-(2); SEMA s.7(1)-(1.1)).
• Speeds up enforcement with fixed timelines for forfeiture and disposal of assets tied to sanctioned targets (JVCOFA s.4.4(1)-(2); SEMA s.5.6(1)-(2)).
• Improves inter-agency action by requiring RCMP and FINTRAC to share relevant information and by setting a 30-day ministerial decision window (JVCOFA s.7.2(3)-(4), s.7.21(2)-(3); SEMA s.6.2(3)-(4), s.6.21(2)-(3)).
• Protects Canada’s information space by denying or revoking broadcasting licences vulnerable to influence by sanctioned or genocidal foreign actors (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1), s.24(4)).

Opponents' View#

• Family-based visa bans may be seen as overbroad and risk penalizing individuals for others’ actions, despite the exemption for non-benefiting relatives (JVCOFA Immediate family; SEMA Immediate family).
• Publishing a list of “prisoners of conscience” could endanger detainees or families, even with consultation and omission safeguards, and may strain diplomatic efforts (DFATD Act s.10(4)-(5)).
• Fixed deadlines for asset forfeiture and disposal may pressure agencies to act before evidence is fully developed, raising litigation risk and possible reversals (JVCOFA s.4.4; SEMA s.5.6).
• The Broadcasting Act test—“vulnerable to being significantly influenced”—may be subjective, creating uncertainty for multicultural or foreign-content broadcasters and potential Charter challenges (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1), s.24(4)).
• Added duties for RCMP and FINTRAC could require new resources to process public tips and meet 30-day timelines; no funding is specified (JVCOFA s.7.2, s.7.21; SEMA s.6.2, s.6.21). Data unavailable.
• The preamble references compensation to victims, but the bill text does not establish a compensation fund or process, so benefits to victims may be limited unless implemented under other laws (Preamble; JVCOFA s.4.4; SEMA s.5.6).