Canada Tightens Military Export Permits

Summary#

This bill amends Canada’s Export and Import Permits Act to align more fully with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It tightens export controls on military goods by removing destination-based exemptions, banning general permits for military items and brokering, and adding risk checks. It also requires detailed annual public reporting on military exports and allows the Minister to require end-use certificates in higher-risk cases.

• Clarifies that parts, components, and technology for assembling or using military goods are covered (Bill: new s. 2(1.01)).
• Prohibits destination-based exemptions for military exports on the Export Control List (Bill: new s. 3(3)).
• Bans general export permits and general brokering permits for military goods and technology (Bill: new s. 7(1.2), s. 7.1(3)).
• Expands risk assessment factors and permits requiring an end-use certificate to mitigate substantial risk (Bill: amended s. 7.3(1); new s. 7.31).
• Requires detailed annual reports on military exports by May 31, including permit lists, quantities, values, destinations, and risk summaries (Bill: new s. 27(2)-(3)).
• Sets transitional rules: existing permits expire 180 days after Royal Assent; General Export Permit No. 47 (to the United States) remains valid only for 180 days after Royal Assent (Transitional).

What it means for you#

• Businesses (defense manufacturers, parts suppliers, and tech firms)

  • Parts, components, and technology needed to assemble or use military goods are explicitly treated as military items for control purposes (Bill: new s. 2(1.01)). This clarifies they are subject to permitting like complete systems.
  • No destination-based exemptions for military goods on the Export Control List (Bill: new s. 3(3)). Firms cannot rely on country exemptions to export controlled military items.
  • No general export permits for military goods and no general brokering permits (Bill: new s. 7(1.2), s. 7.1(3)). Exporters and brokers will need individual permits for these items, regardless of destination.
  • Permit review must consider risks that items could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations in either the destination or end-use country; adds a new ATT-related consideration (Bill: amended s. 7.3(1)(b)-(c)).
  • The Minister must require an end-use certificate from the destination government if that document would sufficiently reduce a substantial risk of war crimes or serious violations (Bill: new s. 7.31; s. 12(a.4) on form/content rules). Exporters may need to secure such certificates before a permit is issued.
  • Existing export or brokering permits expire 180 days after Royal Assent, with deemed reapplication and an expedited review under the amended rules (Transitional (1)-(3)). Plan for revalidation of permits within that window.
  • General Export Permit No. 47 (ATT items to the United States) remains valid for 180 days after Royal Assent, then lapses (Transitional). After that, shipments of covered items to the United States will need individual permits under the amended Act.

• Brokers of military goods or technology

  • No general brokering permits for military items (Bill: new s. 7.1(3)). Each transaction will require a specific brokering permit.
  • End-use certificates may be required where they mitigate a substantial risk (Bill: new s. 7.31).

• Researchers, journalists, and civil society

  • Annual reports by May 31 will list military export permits issued, monthly quantities and values by control list line, destination countries, summaries of risk assessments, and mitigation steps (Bill: new s. 27(2)-(3)). This increases accessible public data on military exports.

• Households and local governments

  • No direct new duties or benefits. Daily life is unlikely to change based on the bill text.

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• Fiscal note: Data unavailable.
• Explicit appropriations in bill text: None identified.
• New fee or revenue changes in bill text: Data unavailable.
• Administrative tasks added: Individual permit processing for military items and brokering, end-use certificate reviews, and expanded annual reporting (Bill: new s. 7(1.2), s. 7.1(3), s. 7.31, s. 27(2)-(3)). Quantitative cost estimates: Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Aligns Canadian law more fully with the Arms Trade Treaty by removing destination-based exemptions and tightening risk controls (Bill: new s. 3(3); amended s. 7.3(1)).
• Closes loopholes from general permits for military goods and brokering, ensuring case-by-case scrutiny (Bill: new s. 7(1.2), s. 7.1(3)).
• Reduces the chance Canadian exports contribute to war crimes or serious violations by allowing the Minister to require end-use certificates when they mitigate substantial risk (Bill: new s. 7.31).
• Enhances transparency and accountability through detailed annual reporting of permits, quantities, values, destinations, and reasons for approvals or denials (Bill: new s. 27(2)-(3)).
• Applies consistent standards regardless of destination, including close allies, which proponents say strengthens due diligence and compliance (Bill: new s. 3(3)).

Opponents' View#

• Eliminating general permits for military items and brokering could slow shipments and raise compliance costs because every transaction needs an individual permit (Bill: new s. 7(1.2), s. 7.1(3)). The bill provides no resources to manage potential volume increases; impact on processing times is unknown (Data unavailable).
• Ending destination-based exemptions, including for the United States, may disrupt integrated supply chains that rely on predictable, rapid transfers (Bill: new s. 3(3); Transitional GEP-47 180-day limit). The scale of disruption is not quantified (Data unavailable).
• Requiring government end-use certificates in some cases could be hard to obtain and may delay or prevent legitimate exports if foreign authorities are slow or unwilling to issue certificates (Bill: new s. 7.31). The frequency and timelines are not specified (Data unavailable).
• For permits already issued, the 180-day expiry creates a revalidation workload for both firms and the department, with a risk of backlogs despite the “expedited” direction (Transitional (1)-(3)). The capacity to meet expedited reviews is not demonstrated (Data unavailable).
• Detailed public reporting of types, quantities, values, and destinations could raise confidentiality or commercial sensitivity concerns for exporters (Bill: new s. 27(3)(a)-(b)). The bill does not specify confidential-business-information safeguards beyond existing law (Data unavailable).