Judges Can Bypass Mandatory Minimums, Consider Treatment

Summary#

This bill changes the Criminal Code to expand judges’ discretion at sentencing. It lets judges depart from mandatory minimum penalties and vary parole ineligibility periods when a law sets a fixed or minimum punishment. Judges must consider all other options before imposing a minimum and must give written reasons if they do. It also makes court‑supervised treatment or counselling easier to use and asks juries to give a recommendation on parole ineligibility in murder cases.

• Judges may impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum after considering alternatives (Clause 1; new provision after 718.3).
• Judges must give written reasons when they choose to impose a minimum penalty or parole ineligibility period (new provision after 718.3(2)).
• Courts can delay sentencing for treatment or counselling without Attorney General consent; programs need not be provincially pre‑approved (Clause 3; 720(2)).
• Juries in first‑ and second‑degree murder cases will be asked for a recommendation on parole ineligibility; the judge must consider it (Clause 4; 745.2).
• The bill’s preamble cites proportionality, equality rights, and over‑incarceration concerns (Preamble).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • If a family member is convicted of a crime with a mandatory minimum, the judge may impose a lower or different sentence, after considering all options (Clause 1; new provision after 718.3).
  • In murder cases, parole eligibility could be set differently than current defaults, after the judge considers the jury’s recommendation (Clause 4; 745.2).

• People accused or convicted

  • Judges can vary punishment even where a statute sets a minimum, but must consider alternatives before imposing the minimum and give written reasons if they do (Clause 1; new provision after 718.3).
  • You may access a court‑supervised treatment or counselling program without needing Attorney General consent; the court can choose an appropriate program, and your consent is required (Clause 3; 720(2)).
  • In first‑ or second‑degree murder cases, the judge will ask the jury for a recommendation on parole ineligibility and must consider it when setting the period (Clause 4; 745.2).

• Victims

  • Courts must consider victims’ interests before delaying sentencing for treatment or counselling (Clause 3; 720(2)).
  • If a judge sets earlier parole eligibility than current law in murder cases, parole reviews may occur sooner, which can affect notification and participation timelines (Clause 4; 745.2).

• Courts, judges, and lawyers

  • Judges gain discretion to depart from minimum penalties and to adjust parole ineligibility, but must issue written reasons when imposing minimums (Clause 1; new provision after 718.3).
  • Sentencing may include more analysis of alternatives and preparation of written reasons; courts may supervise more treatment or counselling programs (Clause 3; 720(2)).

• Correctional and parole authorities

  • Parole ineligibility periods in murder cases may vary more often, requiring scheduling and review adjustments (Clause 4; 745.2).
  • Overall custody time could change depending on how judges use new discretion; operational impacts depend on case outcomes (Data unavailable).

• Provinces and territories

  • Courts may refer people to programs that are not on a provincially pre‑approved list; program availability, standards, and coordination may need review (Clause 3; 720(2)).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• The bill contains no direct appropriations, taxes, or fees (Bill text).
• Court operations: Possible costs for preparing written reasons and supervising programs; scale depends on judicial practice (Data unavailable).
• Corrections and parole: Custody and parole workloads may change if sentences or ineligibility periods change; net fiscal effect unknown (Data unavailable).

Proponents' View#

• Restores proportional, individualized sentencing by allowing judges to depart from minimums when justified, reducing the risk of disproportionate outcomes (Clause 1; new provision after 718.3; Preamble).
• Increases transparency and accountability by requiring written reasons when a court still imposes a minimum penalty or parole ineligibility period (new provision after 718.3(2)).
• Helps address over‑incarceration of Indigenous Peoples and people with mental disabilities by enabling tailored sentences, consistent with Criminal Code 718.2(e) and equality rights (Preamble; references 718.2(e)).
• Expands access to court‑supervised treatment or counselling that fits the person and the case, without the Attorney General veto and without limiting programs to those pre‑approved by a province (Clause 3; 720(2)).
• Gives juries a voice in both first‑ and second‑degree murder cases on parole ineligibility; judges must consider that recommendation when setting the period (Clause 4; 745.2).
• May reduce unnecessary incarceration and associated public costs when non‑custodial or shorter options are appropriate (Assumes judges will depart from minimums in some cases; no fiscal estimate).

Opponents' View#

• Undercuts Parliament’s mandatory minimum penalties by making them effectively optional, which could reduce sentence consistency and general deterrence (Clause 1; new provision after 718.3).
• Expands sentencing variation across judges and regions, increasing uncertainty and potential appeals over what is “just and reasonable” (new provision after 718.3).
• Enables earlier parole eligibility in first‑degree murder if a judge departs from the 25‑year period, which may lead to more and earlier parole hearings for victims (Clause 4; 745.2; Clause 1).
• Removes Attorney General consent and provincial pre‑approval for programs, which may lead to uneven program quality and oversight concerns (Clause 3; 720(2)).
• Adds administrative burden: written‑reasons requirement and court supervision of programs could lengthen proceedings and strain resources (new provision after 718.3(2); Clause 3; 720(2)).
• Public safety risk if lower sentences or earlier parole are granted to higher‑risk individuals; relies on judicial assessments rather than fixed minimums (Assumption noted; no outcome data).