Tax agency to reveal tax gap, convictions

Summary#

This bill amends the Canada Revenue Agency Act to increase public reporting on tax evasion and the “tax gap.” It requires the CRA to list all tax evasion convictions in its annual report, with a separate list for international cases (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1)). It also requires tax gap statistics to be added to the CRA annual report once every three years and gives the Parliamentary Budget Officer access to the underlying data (Clause 2, s.88(3); new s.88.1(2)-(4)).

• CRA must publish a detailed list of all tax evasion convictions each year, including a separate international list (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1)).
• Every three years, the CRA annual report must include tax gap statistics, as defined in the bill (Clause 2, s.88(3); new s.88.1(1)-(2)).
• The bill defines “tax gap” and sets minimum elements for estimating it, including audit reassessments and unreported foreign property (new s.88.1(1)).
• The Minister must provide tax gap data to the Parliamentary Budget Officer for further analysis, subject to confidentiality rules (new s.88.1(3)-(4)).

What it means for you#

• Households and individual taxpayers

  • You will be able to see, in the CRA annual report, a list of all court convictions for tax evasion, and a separate list for international cases (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1)).
  • Every three years, you will see tax gap statistics in the CRA annual report. These will cover individuals, corporations (by size), and trusts (Clause 2, s.88(3); new s.88.1(2)).

• Businesses and trusts

  • Your sector will be included in the tax gap statistics, with corporations segmented by size. The statistics must draw on audit results and other elements named in the bill (Clause 2, s.88(3); new s.88.1(1)-(2)).
  • No new taxes, fees, or penalties are created by this bill. It changes reporting and data sharing only. Data unavailable on any indirect compliance impacts.

• Parliament and the Parliamentary Budget Officer

  • The PBO must receive the tax gap data the Minister collects and any additional relevant data the PBO requests for deeper analysis, under existing confidentiality safeguards in the Parliament of Canada Act (new s.88.1(3)-(4)).
  • This may support independent analysis for committees and MPs on tax compliance trends. Data unavailable on scope or frequency beyond the triennial CRA reporting requirement.

• General public, media, and researchers

  • You will have more detailed, regular information on tax evasion convictions and on the tax gap to inform debate and research (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1); s.88(3); new s.88.1(2)).

• Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)

  • The CRA must compile and publish the conviction lists annually and include tax gap statistics every three years on an ongoing schedule that starts three years after the law comes into force (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1); s.88(3)).
  • The Minister must collect, compile, analyze, and summarize tax gap data using the elements listed in the bill, and provide the data set to the PBO (new s.88.1(1)-(3)).

Expenses#

• Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No explicit appropriations or funding are provided in the bill text (Clauses 2–3).

• The bill imposes new reporting and data-sharing duties on the CRA and the Minister:

  • Annual conviction lists, with a separate international list (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1)).
  • Triennial tax gap statistics in the CRA annual report (Clause 2, s.88(3); new s.88.1(2)).
  • Ongoing provision of tax gap data to the PBO, under confidentiality rules (new s.88.1(3)-(4)).

• The bill creates no new taxes, fees, or penalties (Clauses 2–3).

• Official fiscal note or cost estimate: Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Transparency on enforcement improves public accountability. Publishing every conviction, with a separate international list, makes outcomes visible and consistent (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1)).
• Regular tax gap reporting helps track non-compliance over time and target enforcement. The triennial schedule sets a predictable cadence (Clause 2, s.88(3)).
• The bill’s definition of “tax gap” and required elements (audit reassessments, incorrect returns detected through audits, and unreported foreign property) make estimates more complete and comparable across taxpayer groups (new s.88.1(1)-(2)).
• Independent oversight improves trust. Giving the PBO access to detailed tax gap data enables further analysis for Parliament, with confidentiality protections in place (new s.88.1(3)-(4)).
• The bill changes reporting only and does not raise taxes or create new penalties, limiting direct burden on taxpayers (Clauses 2–3).

Opponents' View#

• Implementation burden and cost risk. Compiling detailed conviction lists and triennial tax gap statistics segmented by taxpayer type may require new systems or staff time; no cost estimate is provided (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1); s.88(3); new s.88.1(2)). Data unavailable on fiscal impact.
• Measurement uncertainty. The tax gap relies on estimates from audits and models; results can vary by method and may be misunderstood by the public or media (new s.88.1(1)).
• Confidentiality concerns. Even with Parliament of Canada Act safeguards, expanding data sharing to the PBO increases handling of sensitive tax data and may raise privacy or security concerns if not managed carefully (new s.88.1(3)-(4)).
• Narrow enforcement picture. A list of convictions reflects only cases that go to court, not all non-compliance resolved through assessments or settlements; this could give an incomplete view of enforcement outcomes (Clause 2, s.88(2)(c.1)).