Summary#

This bill, called the Bank of Canada Accountability Act, would add the Auditor General of Canada as one of the Bank of Canada’s auditors. It also keeps an external audit firm, sets a five‑year, non‑renewable term for that firm, and updates two related laws. The bill narrows an exemption in the Financial Administration Act so certain sections apply to the Bank.

• Adds the Auditor General as a co‑auditor of the Bank of Canada (Bank of Canada Act s.28(1)).
• Requires a private audit firm appointed by Cabinet, on the Finance Minister’s advice, to audit the Bank for five years and not for back‑to‑back terms (s.28(1.1), s.28(2), s.28(4)).
• Bars any audit firm if a Bank director is a member of that firm (s.28(4)).
• Sets a process to replace the audit firm if a vacancy occurs (s.28(3)).
• Updates the Auditor General Act’s definition of “registrar” to include the Bank (Auditor General Act s.2).
• Narrows the Bank’s exemption under the Financial Administration Act so specified sections apply (Financial Administration Act s.85(1)).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • No change to the Bank of Canada’s mandate, interest‑rate tools, or your bank services. The bill only changes who audits the Bank (Bank of Canada Act s.28).
  • The Auditor General becomes one of the Bank’s auditors. Audit findings would be subject to normal reporting rules for the Auditor General (s.28(1); Auditor General Act s.2).

• Workers

  • Bank of Canada employees would respond to audit requests from both the Auditor General and a private audit firm once the law takes effect (s.28(1)).

• Businesses and financial institutions

  • No new duties for private banks or firms. The audit changes apply to the Bank of Canada itself (s.28).

• Federal government and Parliament

  • Cabinet (Governor in Council) appoints the private audit firm on the Finance Minister’s recommendation, for a single five‑year term (s.28(1.1), s.28(2), s.28(4)).
  • Some sections of the Financial Administration Act would newly apply to the Bank; the bill lists the section numbers but does not describe them (Financial Administration Act s.85(1)).

• Timing

  • The bill does not set a special start date. In Canada, Acts without a coming‑into‑force clause generally take effect on Royal Assent.

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No direct appropriation in the bill text (Bill overall).
• Expected new workload for the Office of the Auditor General to audit the Bank of Canada. Amount and staffing needs: Data unavailable.
• Ongoing fees for the private audit firm with mandatory five‑year rotation. Amount: Data unavailable.
• Any transition costs at the Bank of Canada to coordinate two auditors. Amount: Data unavailable.
• No publicly available fiscal note identified.

Proponents' View#

• Adds an independent Officer of Parliament as auditor, which strengthens oversight of the Bank’s financial reporting and controls (Bank of Canada Act s.28(1)).
• Keeps an external private audit firm and requires mandatory rotation after five years, which can reduce familiarity risk and improve independence (s.28(2), s.28(4)).
• Bars firms linked to Bank directors, which reduces conflict‑of‑interest risk (s.28(4)).
• Ensures continuity by requiring quick replacement of any vacated private auditor (s.28(3)).
• Narrows the Bank’s exemption under the Financial Administration Act so specified sections apply, which proponents say tightens accountability (Financial Administration Act s.85(1)).
• Does not change the Bank’s policy mandate or tools, so monetary policy independence remains intact (Bill text; no mandate changes).

Opponents' View#

• Two auditors can duplicate work, raise audit fees, and increase demands on Bank staff, with unclear benefits. The bill sets dual audits but gives no cost controls (s.28(1); Data unavailable).
• Mandatory five‑year auditor rotation may raise costs and reduce institutional knowledge, which can lower audit efficiency (s.28(2), s.28(4)).
• Adding the Auditor General as auditor could be seen as expanding political oversight of a central bank. Critics warn this perception could affect the Bank’s independence, even though the bill does not alter its mandate (s.28(1)).
• The bill narrows the Bank’s exemption from parts of the Financial Administration Act but does not explain the listed sections. Opponents cite legal uncertainty until guidance clarifies what those sections require (Financial Administration Act s.85(1)).
• Coordinating two auditors without a detailed framework in the bill could cause delays in issuing financial statements or audit opinions (s.28(1); Data unavailable).