Summary#

This bill requires the federal Minister of Health to create, publish, and regularly update a national plan to prevent and prepare for future pandemics. It also amends the Department of Health Act to require a national coordinator at the Public Health Agency of Canada to lead this work. The plan must use a “One Health” approach (a joint human–animal–environment lens) and include input from several federal ministers, provinces, territories, and Indigenous communities. The first plan is due within two years of the Act coming into force, with updates at least every three years (Bill 3(4), 4(1)).

• Sets deadlines to table a public plan within two years and update it at least every three years (Bill 3(4), 4(1)-(3)).
• Requires a coordinator at the Public Health Agency of Canada to oversee activities (Department of Health Act amendment).
• Mandates collaboration with provinces, territories, and Indigenous communities on data sharing, training, and preparedness (Bill 3(2)(c)-(d)).
• Calls for linked disease surveillance systems, stockpile planning, and surge staffing strategies (Bill 3(2)(g), 3(2)(i)(iii)-(iv), 3(2)(j)).
• Directs analysis of domestic manufacturing capacity for vaccines, tests, and PPE, and actions to fill gaps (Bill 3(2)(k)(i)).
• Requires consideration of measures on activities tied to pandemic risk (e.g., industrial animal agriculture, live animal markets, wildlife trade, land-use change) within the plan (Bill 3(2)(l), 3(2)(m)).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • No immediate changes to daily life. The bill is about planning and reporting, not new rules or benefits.
  • Future outbreaks may see clearer risk communication and more coordinated responses if measures from the plan are later funded and implemented (Bill 3(2)(i)(v)).

• Workers

  • Essential workers: The plan must address working conditions during outbreaks as part of preparedness strategies (Bill 3(2)(i)(ii)).
  • Health workers: The plan must “provide for” training to handle sudden surges in patients (Bill 3(2)(j)). This is a planning requirement; training occurs only if funded later.

• Businesses

  • Manufacturers of vaccines, tests, and PPE: The plan must list domestic capacity and steps to address supply gaps (Bill 3(2)(k)(i)).
  • Communications and app providers: The plan must cover capacity for digital tools, including contact tracing apps (Bill 3(2)(k)(ii)).
  • Agriculture and wildlife trade sectors: The plan must consider measures to regulate or phase out activities that increase pandemic risk, including parts of industrial animal agriculture, live animal markets, and trade in high-risk species (Bill 3(2)(l)(ii)-(iv), 3(2)(m)(ii)). The bill itself does not enact these measures.

• Local and Indigenous governments

  • Must be engaged in developing the plan, including on data collection and sharing (Bill 3(2)(c)).
  • May be offered training and support for public health capacity if such measures are later approved and funded (Bill 3(2)(d), 3(2)(h)).

• Travelers and border users

  • The plan must assess how pathogens could enter Canada and summarize border measures that would be used to reduce risk (Bill 3(2)(p)). This is planning only; it does not change current border rules.

• Timing

  • First plan due within two years after the Act comes into force; updates at least every three years (Bill 3(4), 4(1)).
  • The coordinator position takes effect through the Department of Health Act amendment once the Act is in force (Department of Health Act amendment).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• The bill contains no appropriation or new revenue (no direct spending authority in the text).
• Administrative costs for appointing a coordinator, preparing the plan, consultations, tabling, and web publication: Data unavailable.
• Potential program costs (if later approved) for training, capacity building, surveillance system interlinking, stockpile management, and manufacturing or communications initiatives are not estimated in the bill (Bill 3(2)(d), 3(2)(g)-(j), 3(2)(k)).
• No official fiscal note identified. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Creates a clear, public, and recurring plan with deadlines, improving accountability and learning over time (Bill 3(4)-(5), 4(1)-(3)).
• Uses a One Health approach to address risks at the human–animal–environment interface, aligning with international metrics and best science (Bill 3(3)(a)-(c)).
• Strengthens core capacities by planning linked surveillance, surge staffing, stockpiles, and risk communication (Bill 3(2)(g), 3(2)(i)(iii)-(v), 3(2)(j)).
• Addresses supply vulnerabilities by mapping domestic manufacturing capacity for vaccines, tests, and PPE and steps to close gaps (Bill 3(2)(k)(i)).
• Improves coordination across governments and with Indigenous communities, which can reduce confusion during emergencies (Bill 3(2)(c)-(d)).
• Integrates international cooperation, border risk analysis, and global health equity measures to reduce importation and spread of disease (Bill 3(2)(n)-(p)).

Opponents' View#

• The plan’s scope touches areas of provincial and Indigenous jurisdiction (health service delivery, land use, data sharing), risking overlap or conflict and adding administrative burden (Bill 3(2)(c), 3(2)(m)).
• The plan must consider regulatory or phase‑out measures for certain sectors (industrial animal agriculture, live animal markets, high‑risk species), but the bill provides no impact analysis or costs, creating uncertainty for businesses (Bill 3(2)(l)(ii)-(iv), 3(2)(m)(ii)).
• Building interlinked surveillance systems and digital contact tracing capacity may raise privacy and cybersecurity concerns; the bill does not set privacy safeguards or data standards (Bill 3(2)(g), 3(2)(k)(ii)).
• No funding details. The bill mandates planning deliverables without resources attached, which could lead to unfunded expectations or delays (no appropriation in bill text).
• Tight timelines and broad consultation requirements may strain departments and partners, risking a high‑level plan with limited operational detail within the two‑year window (Bill 3(4)).