Summary#

This bill rewrites how Canada handles complaints about the conduct of federally appointed judges. It replaces the Canadian Judicial Council’s (CJC) old inquiry model with a tiered system that can issue remedies short of removal and, when needed, recommend removal to the Minister of Justice. It also covers other federal “good behaviour” office holders and sets clear rules for public hearings, appeals within the system, reporting, and funding.

• Creates screening, review, reduced-hearing, full-hearing, and appeal panels, with public hearings by default (Part IV).
• Lets panels impose lesser sanctions (warnings, reprimands, apologies, training) when removal is not justified (Part IV, Division 1 – Review Panel Actions).
• Includes lay persons on panels and requires diverse rosters, published selection criteria, and annual public reporting (Part IV, Division 1 – Rosters; Division 4 – Annual report).
• Allows anonymous complaints in limited cases, with safeguards (Part IV, Division 1 – Complaints).
• Centralizes appeals inside the process and limits outside judicial review, with possible leave to the Supreme Court of Canada (Part IV, Division 1 – Appeals and Supreme Court; Division 4 – Decision final).
• Pays panel costs and lawyers’ fees from the federal Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF), subject to regulations and guidelines (Financial Provisions).

What it means for you#

• Households and court users

  • You can file a complaint about a federally appointed judge using the CJC’s specified form. Anonymous complaints are allowed but proceed only if two CJC members see grounds that public confidence could be undermined (Part IV, Division 1 – Complaints).
  • Hearings are public by default. Panels can go private or ban publication if the public interest requires it. Decisions and reasons are published as much as possible (Part IV, Division 1 – Hearings public; Decision and reasons made public).
  • Complaints that allege sexual misconduct, sexual harassment, or discrimination cannot be dismissed at the screening stage (Part IV, Division 1 – Screening Officer Restriction).

• Workers and professionals (judges, prothonotaries, lawyers)

  • Prothonotaries of the Federal Court are treated as holding “judicial office” for this process (Part IV, Division 1 – Definition of judicial office).
  • Judges gain due-process rights: to be heard, to cross‑examine witnesses, and to present evidence, with counsel (Part IV, Division 1 – Rights of Judge).
  • If a full hearing panel finds removal justified, pension calculations change the next day. Contributions pause, but are later reconciled if the decision is overturned or no removal occurs (Part IV, Division 1 – Salaries and Annuities).
  • Presenting counsel prosecutes the case; judges may have their legal fees paid from the CRF for these proceedings, but not for judicial reviews outside this process (Financial Provisions).
  • Hearings and appeals may proceed by remote appearance (Division 4 – Remote appearance).

• Businesses and media

  • More decisions and reasons will be public, subject to privacy limits, aiding reporting and compliance training on courtroom conduct (Part IV, Division 1 – Decision and reasons made public).

• Provincial and federal governments

  • The federal Minister or a provincial attorney general can request a full hearing panel to assess whether removal is justified (Division 2 – Requests Concerning Judges).
  • For other federal “good behaviour” office holders, the Minister may request a full hearing panel, and the Governor in Council may remove by order where permitted (Division 3 – Requests Concerning Office Holders).

• Taxpayers

  • The CRF pays for panel operations, presenting counsel, some defence counsel fees, experts, and hearing costs. The Commissioner sets public guidelines for fees and must justify any differences from Treasury Board norms (Financial Provisions).
  • An independent review of these financial rules occurs within 18 months of the first report and every 5 years, with findings made public (Financial Provisions).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No official fiscal note or public cost estimate found. The bill has a Royal Recommendation, indicating new spending authority (Preamble – Recommendation).
• The bill directs payments from the CRF for specified costs and sets up regulations and guidelines to control them (Financial Provisions).

• Key cost controls and transparency:
  • Governor in Council regulations on fees and expenses (Financial Provisions).
  • Commissioner’s public guidelines, with reasons for any deviations from Treasury Board directives (Financial Provisions).
  • Independent review report made public, assessing consistency with best practices in financial controls (Financial Provisions).

Proponents' View#

• More proportionate and efficient discipline: Panels can issue corrective measures short of removal (warnings, training, apologies), avoiding full-blown inquiries for mid-level misconduct (Part IV, Division 1 – Review Panel Actions).
• Greater transparency and public confidence: Public hearings by default; publication of decisions and annual caseload statistics; public rosters and selection criteria; inclusion of lay persons and attention to diversity and official languages (Part IV, Division 1 – Hearings public; Rosters; Division 4 – Annual report).
• Clear removal standard protects independence: Removal must be justified based on defined grounds and the effect on public confidence, aligning with constitutional principles (s. 80 – Removal Justification).
• Streamlined appeals and finality reduce delay: Internal appeal panel, limited court review, and possible leave to the Supreme Court of Canada focus challenges within a set pathway (Part IV, Division 1 – Appeals and Supreme Court; Division 4 – Decision final).
• Access and safety for complainants: Anonymous complaints are possible when justified; sexual misconduct and discrimination complaints cannot be screened out early (Part IV, Division 1 – Complaints; Screening Officer Restriction).
• Cost governance: Payments flow under regulations and public guidelines, with periodic independent audits to check best practices (Financial Provisions).

Opponents' View#

• Independence and perception risks: Letting the Minister designate one lawyer on a full hearing panel could be seen as executive influence, even with backups when the Minister is the requester (Part IV, Division 1 – Full Hearing Panel, s. on lawyer designation).
• Limited judicial review: Making CJC decisions “final” outside this scheme concentrates adjudicative power and may reduce external court oversight, raising rule-of-law concerns (Division 4 – Decision final).
• Anonymous complaints and reputational harm: Allowing anonymity and public hearings could increase exposure to unverified claims, despite screening and public-interest safeguards (Part IV, Division 1 – Complaints; Hearings public).
• Uncertain and potentially rising costs: The CRF must pay for panels, counsel (including defence for judges), and hearing logistics; no monetary caps are in the bill, creating budget exposure until regulations and guidelines set parameters (Financial Provisions).
• Process complexity and timelines: Multiple stages (screening, review, reduced hearing, full hearing, appeal, possible SCC leave) could still lead to long cases, even if designed to be more proportionate (Part IV, Divisions 1–2).
• Pension timing rule: Treating the day after a full hearing panel’s “removal justified” decision as the pension calculation date may appear premature before Parliament or the Minister completes the removal step, even though the bill provides exceptions if the decision is overturned or not acted on (Part IV, Division 1 – Salaries and Annuities).