Safe Social Media Act

Full Title:
An Act to enact the Digital Safety Act and the Digital Safety Commission of Canada Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

Summary#

Bill C-34 creates two new laws: the Digital Safety Act and the Digital Safety Commission of Canada Act. Together, they set safety duties for large social media sites, public chatbots, and some other online services used in Canada. The goal is to reduce online harms, especially to children, while increasing transparency and accountability by service operators.

Key changes:

  • Creates a new federal Digital Safety Commission of Canada to administer and enforce the rules.
  • Sets operator duties to protect children (age checks for porn access, child‑safety design features), act responsibly (risk‑reduction measures, tools to block and flag harmful content), and be transparent (publish digital safety plans).
  • Requires fast inaccessibility in Canada (usually within 24 hours) of content that sexually victimizes a child, revictimizes a survivor, or shares intimate images without consent; adds a complaint pathway to the Commission.
  • Imposes special rules on public chatbots to reduce harmful content, require crisis interruption and referral to human help, and prevent deceptive or manipulative behaviour.
  • Requires labelling of some synthetic (AI/deepfake) content and harmful content amplified by bots; excludes private messaging features from these duties.
  • Establishes inspections, orders, and significant fines for non‑compliance; many details will be set later by regulations.

What it means for you#

  • Users and parents

    • You may see more safety tools: ways to block users, flag harmful content, and clearer user guidelines.
    • Pornographic content on regulated services must have age‑verification or age‑estimation to reduce access by minors.
    • Some social media services may be required by regulation to set a minimum age of 16 for accounts or registration.
    • Platforms must, in most cases, make certain sexual exploitation content and non‑consensual intimate images inaccessible in Canada within 24 hours. You can ask the Commission to intervene if you first try the platform’s process and it fails.
    • You may see labels on some AI‑generated content and on harmful content that is being mass‑pushed by bots.
  • Survivors of non‑consensual intimate image sharing and child sexual exploitation

    • Platforms must quickly make this content inaccessible in Canada and notify involved users. There is a process for representations and reconsideration.
    • If platform steps are not enough, you can complain to the Commission, which can order interim and permanent inaccessibility in Canada.
  • Social media companies (meeting size/designation thresholds)

    • Must implement risk‑reduction measures for harmful content, provide blocking and flagging tools, label certain synthetic content, and publish user guidelines.
    • Must integrate child‑safety design features (set by regulation). If your service provides access to pornographic content, you must implement privacy‑protective age checks. Some services may need to prevent under‑16 accounts, unless exempted for adequate safeguards.
    • Must submit and publicly post a digital safety plan with detailed information about risks, measures, enforcement metrics, and resources (no personal information).
    • Must make certain content (child sexual exploitation and non‑consensual intimate content) inaccessible within timelines, and preserve some violent/terrorist content for one year if made inaccessible.
    • Are subject to inspections, information requests, compliance orders, administrative monetary penalties, and offences with high fines.
  • Public chatbot providers (meeting size/designation thresholds)

    • Must reduce the risk the chatbot will communicate harmful content and engage in listed harmful behaviours (e.g., pretending to be human or a licensed professional, manipulative attachment).
    • Must interrupt and refer users to human crisis services when users express suicidal ideation or intent to self‑harm or harm others.
    • Must provide flagging tools, a resource person, publish user guidelines, and file and post a digital safety plan.
  • Other online services

    • Some categories may be brought under the Act (for child protection and transparency duties) by regulation if they pose significant risk to children. Sites mainly for e‑commerce, directories, search, maps, or navigation are excluded from “online service” for these purposes. Private messaging features are excluded.
  • Researchers and educators

    • Can apply to be accredited by the Commission to access inventories of electronic data listed in digital safety plans.
    • May request Commission orders for access to specific underlying data (with confidentiality and no personal information), to conduct research related to the Act’s purposes.
  • Telecom providers

    • Basic Internet connectivity services are excluded from operator duties under this Act.
  • Timing

    • The Act takes effect on dates set by Cabinet. Many specifics (service size thresholds, required design features, labelling criteria, timelines) will come by regulation. The Minister must review the Act, and the minimum‑age rules, within about three years.

Expenses#

The bill may increase administrative and compliance costs, but no official cost estimate is provided.

  • Creates a new Digital Safety Commission with members, staff, inspections, hearings, and reporting. The bill allows cost recovery through charges on regulated operators; exact amounts are not provided.
  • Operators will likely face costs to build age‑verification or age‑estimation, child‑safety design features, flagging and blocking tools, crisis‑interruption functions for chatbots, synthetic content labelling, record‑keeping, and public reporting.
  • Potential penalties for non‑compliance are significant (administrative penalties up to the greater of $10 million or 3% of global revenue; offences up to the greater of $20 million or 5% of global revenue for operators).
  • Additional costs may arise from responding to inspections, information requests, and Commission orders, and from handling user complaints.
  • Municipalities are not directly affected by costs identified in the bill.
  • No publicly available information on net fiscal impact to the federal budget.

Proponents' View#

  • The bill appears intended to reduce online harms to children and the wider public by setting clear, enforceable safety duties for major online services.
  • Fast inaccessibility of child sexual exploitation material and non‑consensual intimate images could limit ongoing harm to victims.
  • Requiring age checks for porn access and, where specified, a minimum age for social media accounts may reduce youth exposure to high‑risk content and features.
  • Public digital safety plans and user tools (blocking, flagging, clear guidelines) could improve transparency and give users more control.
  • Labelling synthetic content and bot‑amplified harmful content could help users spot fakes and manipulation.
  • Chatbot rules on crisis intervention and against deceptive or manipulative behaviour could address new AI‑related risks.
  • The Act instructs the Commission to consider freedom of expression, equality rights, and privacy, excludes private messaging features, limits proactive scanning, and requires privacy‑protective age checks, which could be seen as balancing safety and rights.
  • Access for accredited researchers to data (without personal information) could improve evidence and standards on online safety.

Opponents' View#

  • One concern is that many key details are left to future regulations (service thresholds, required design features, labelling criteria, timelines), making impacts and burdens hard to predict.
  • Age‑verification and minimum‑age rules, even with data‑minimizing safeguards, may raise privacy, accuracy, and access questions. It is unclear which methods will be accepted in practice.
  • The duty to make content inaccessible within 24 hours and to label synthetic or bot‑amplified content could lead to errors or over‑removal that may affect lawful expression, especially in context‑dependent cases.
  • Compliance duties and reporting are extensive. Meeting them could be costly and complex, particularly for mid‑sized services that are designated because of risk.
  • Broad inspection and information‑request powers, plus orders to provide certain non‑personal data to accredited researchers, may raise confidentiality and data‑security concerns for companies.
  • Private messaging features are excluded, which could limit the Act’s reach if harmful content shifts to private channels.
  • The bill allows regulations that could require technological measures to block upload of certain child sexual exploitation content; how this would be implemented, and its effects on users and services, is not yet clear.