Allow Banks to Hold or Reverse Fraudulent Payments

Summary#

The STOP Payments Fraud Act of 2026 would amend the federal Expedited Funds Availability Act; it would not create a separate program or agency. Its stated goal is to provide exceptions to funds-availability rules for suspected fraudulent checks and wire transfers. The bill is not yet law, and the supplied text does not include the current Act needed to verify all the changes.

  • It would let a bank or other receiving depository institution delay availability of a deposited check when it has reasonable suspicion the check is false, unauthorized, or otherwise involves fraud. The institution would have to give notice explaining its reasons.
  • It would create a similar exception for incoming wire transfers. A decision could not be based on a class of wire transfers or people.
  • Rules jointly set by the Federal Reserve Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau would identify higher-fraud-risk circumstances in which certain availability exceptions apply to any deposit in an account, whether or not the account is new. The period would be set by rule and could not exceed 60 days for each occurrence.
  • It would bar certain overdraft fees when a wire is delayed without the required written notice and unavailable funds caused the overdraft. Regulators would check compliance during regular examinations, and institutions would have to keep records of the notices.
  • It would remove two listed categories from an existing check-related provision and change a cross-reference. Without the current Act’s text, the affected check types and the exact practical change cannot be confirmed.

What it means for you#

  • People depositing checks or receiving wires: Your funds could be delayed if the receiving institution has the required reasonable suspicion and follows the rules and notice requirements. The bill does not set a maximum delay for an individual suspected-fraud check or wire.
  • People with accounts flagged under higher-risk circumstances: Certain availability exceptions could apply to any deposit in the account for a rule-set period of up to 60 days per occurrence. The bill does not limit this to new accounts.
  • People whose delayed wire leaves them short of funds: The institution could not charge a later overdraft fee if it did not provide the required written notice when delaying the wire and the overdraft would not otherwise have happened.
  • Banks and other depository institutions: They would have to follow the new rules and notice requirements, keep records of notices about delayed wires, and could tell other institutions involved in a deposit that an exception was invoked.
  • Federal regulators: The Federal Reserve Board and CFPB would have to jointly issue rules. The agencies that examine depository institutions would have to monitor wire-transfer compliance during regular examinations.
  • Everyone else: The bill does not directly change taxes, create a benefit, or establish a new public-facing service.

Money#

No cost estimate or appropriation appears in the supplied material.

  • Institutions would have to retain records of notices about delayed wires, and regulators would have to check compliance during regular examinations. The bill gives no cost estimate or staffing details.
  • The bill does not set a fee or fine.

What is unclear#

  • The supplied material does not include the current Expedited Funds Availability Act, so the exact effect of the check-category changes—and how much of the bill’s wording changes existing law—could not be verified.
  • The bill does not define “fraud” or list the indicators that would amount to reasonable suspicion. It requires indicators that would lead a reasonable person to suspect fraud.
  • The rules would need to set higher-risk circumstances and the related delay period. The bill does not state how often such circumstances may recur or set an overall limit across repeated occurrences.
  • For suspected-fraud checks and wires, the bill does not itself set a maximum delay or provide detailed review or appeal steps.
  • The bill does not give an effective date.

Case for#

  • The bill appears intended to let institutions avoid making suspected fraudulent funds available under ordinary timelines.
  • Requiring reasonable-person indicators and written notice with reasons could make the basis for a delay more accountable.
  • The wire-transfer rule against decisions based on a class of transfers or people limits how the exception may be applied.
  • The overdraft-fee protection addresses one specific harm that a delayed wire could cause.

Case against#

  • A funds delay can affect a person’s access to money. The bill does not set a maximum delay for an individual check or wire under the fraud exception.
  • “Reasonable suspicion” depends on indicators that the bill does not list; the rules will determine how the standard works in practice.
  • A higher-risk designation could affect every deposit in an account, including accounts that are not new. The bill allows up to 60 days per occurrence but does not set an overall limit for repeated occurrences.
  • The bill requires new joint rules and recordkeeping but supplies no cost estimate or detailed process for challenging a delay.