Random Case Assignments Across Courts

Full Title:
BOASBERG Act

Summary#

This bill would require federal district courts and courts of appeals to use random processes for assigning civil cases and for forming and assigning appellate panels. It also creates rules for reassigning cases in limited situations, including when the Supreme Court intervenes, and adds transparency and reporting requirements. The goal is to reduce case “shopping” and increase public confidence in impartial case assignment.

  • Main change: district courts must randomly assign all civil cases and circuits must randomly assign judges to panels and panels to cases.
  • Reassignment rule: if the Supreme Court takes certain actions (for example, vacates or reverses a district-court judgment or issues certain writs or stays), the case would be reassigned by a random process to a different judge.
  • Limits on declines and self‑assignment: judges (including chief judges) may not decline cases after random assignment, and chief judges may not self‑assign or influence assignments.
  • Transparency: courts must publish assignment rules and issue a public memorandum when a case cannot be randomly assigned or is reassigned; clerks must publish annual statistics about assignments and reassignments.
  • Enforcement: attempts to manipulate assignment can lead to lawyer sanctions, judicial misconduct proceedings, or employee discipline.
  • Three-judge courts and Federal Circuit: the bill adds a random-assignment rule for three-judge district courts and allows the Federal Circuit limited flexibility about panel size and rotation.

What it means for you#

  • Litigants in federal civil cases: Your case would be placed with a judge through a required random process. Reassignments would be rare and allowed only for listed reasons.
  • Lawyers practicing in federal court: You would be barred from taking steps to influence which judge or panel gets a case. Sanctions could follow improper attempts to manipulate assignments.
  • Federal judges: Judges would normally receive cases through a court-wide random system. Judges could not decline cases after assignment (except as required by existing recusal rules or for senior-judge reduced caseloads). Chief judges could not self-assign or influence assignments.
  • Appellate panels: Circuits must randomly assign judges to panels and then panels to cases. The Federal Circuit may set special rules for panel rotation and panel size.
  • Three-judge district courts: Judges for mandatory three-judge courts would be chosen by random assignment or designation under new circuit rules.
  • Court clerks and administrators: Clerks must publish assignment rules, memoranda explaining non-random assignments or reassignments, and an annual statistical report on assignments.
  • Public and media: More public documentation about assignment rules and reassignments would be available, but courts must not publicly post identities of emergency on-call judges to avoid circumvention.

Expenses#

No publicly available information.

  • The bill requires courts to adopt new rules, publish memoranda and annual statistics, and likely to change assignment systems. This could mean added administrative work, possible software or IT changes, and staff time.
  • Random reassignment after Supreme Court actions could cause additional judicial and clerical work, which could slow case progress and raise indirect costs.
  • There is no fiscal note in the supplied material estimating implementation costs or savings.

Proponents' View#

  • The bill appears intended to reduce “judge shopping” by making assignments random and preventing parties or officials from influencing which judge or panel hears a case.
  • This could be seen as promoting public confidence in judicial impartiality and fairness.
  • The added transparency (public rules, memos explaining reassignments, and annual statistics) could improve accountability about how cases are assigned.
  • A clear rule that judges may not decline assignments and chief judges may not self‑assign could standardize practices across districts and circuits.

Opponents' View#

  • One concern is that the bill may disrupt judicial continuity: reassigning cases (especially after Supreme Court action) can require a new judge to review the record and may slow resolution.
  • The bill does not specify technical details about how randomization must be done (for example, what software or algorithm to use), which may create uncertainty and uneven practices across courts.
  • The rules leave open what counts as a case being “substantially related” for consolidation or reassignment, which may cause disputes or inconsistency.
  • Implementing public memoranda and annual reports, plus changing assignment systems, could impose administrative and IT costs on courts; the bill does not estimate these costs or provide funding.
  • The prohibition on publicly posting the identity of emergency on-call judges is intended to prevent circumvention, but it also limits transparency about emergency assignments; the bill does not explain how to balance those interests.
  • The 120-day deadline for courts to adopt rules may be short for designing secure randomization systems and training staff.