No Replacement Workers in Federal Strikes

Summary#

This bill amends the Canada Labour Code to ban the use of replacement workers during a legal strike or lockout in federally regulated workplaces. It sets narrow safety and conservation exceptions, adds strong fines for violations, and creates a path for either side to ask the labour board to settle a new agreement after a prolonged dispute.

• Bans employers from using contractors, newly hired workers, or other employees to do the work of striking or locked‑out workers (s. 94(2.1)(a)-(c)).
• Allows limited use of staff for safety, property protection, or environmental protection only, not to keep producing goods or services (s. 94(2.2)-(2.3)).
• Lets either party apply to the Board to settle the terms of a new collective agreement after 90 days, with conditions (Division V.01).
• Requires employers to reinstate striking/locked‑out employees ahead of any other person when the dispute ends (s. 87.6).
• Authorizes investigations and orders to stop unlawful use of replacement workers (s. 94(2.5)-(2.10); s. 99(1)(b.3)).
• Sets fines up to CAD $100,000 per day for violations (s. 100(5)).

What it means for you#

• Federally regulated workplaces

  • Applies to workplaces covered by the Canada Labour Code. Examples typically include banks, interprovincial transport, telecom, and some Crown corporations. This bill does not change coverage; it changes rules during strikes and lockouts.

• Unionized employees

  • During a legal strike or lockout, your employer cannot use contractors, people hired after notice to bargain, or other employees to do your work, except for limited safety/conservation tasks (s. 94(2.1)-(2.3)).
  • When the dispute ends, you must be reinstated in preference to any other person (s. 87.6).
  • If no agreement is reached after at least 90 days on strike/lockout, and after at least 30 days of good‑faith bargaining with assistance, your union may apply to the Board to settle a new agreement (Division V.01).

• Employers

  • You must not use replacement workers to perform any duties of striking/locked‑out employees, including:
    • People hired after notice to bargain until a new agreement or award takes effect (s. 94(2.1)(a)).
    • Contractors or employees of another employer (s. 94(2.1)(b)).
    • Your own other employees (s. 94(2.1)(c)).
  • You may use personnel only as needed to prevent threats to life, health, or safety; serious damage to equipment or premises; or serious environmental damage. This is for conservation only, not to continue production (s. 94(2.2)-(2.3)).
  • Senior managers, directors, or officers may perform work, unless they hold that role by designation from employees or a certified union (s. 94(2.4)).
  • The Board can order you to stop using prohibited replacement workers during a dispute (s. 99(1)(b.3)). Violations can lead to fines up to $100,000 per day (s. 100(5)).
  • After 90 days of a legal strike/lockout, with at least 30 days of assisted good‑faith bargaining and no agreement, you may apply to the Board to settle the new agreement (Division V.01).

• Contractors, staffing agencies, and non‑unit employees

  • You cannot be used to do the work of striking/locked‑out employees during a legal dispute, unless it is strictly for safety or conservation tasks (s. 94(2.1)-(2.3)).

• Managers and officers

  • You may perform work of striking/locked‑out employees to the extent allowed, but not to continue production beyond safety/conservation needs. The exemption does not apply if you serve in that capacity by designation from employees or a certified union (s. 94(2.3)-(2.4)).

• During strikes or lockouts

  • Production of goods or services that depend on striking workers must pause, except for safety, property protection, or environmental conservation work (s. 94(2.1)-(2.3)).
  • The Minister may appoint an investigator on application, who can enter the workplace at reasonable times, be accompanied by employer and union designees, require assistance, and report findings (s. 94(2.5)-(2.10)).

• Timing

  • The bill does not state a specific coming‑into‑force date in the provided text. Effects begin after the law comes into force. Data unavailable.

Expenses#

• Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• Key points

  • The bill includes no explicit appropriations or funding levels (Bill text).
  • Administration may involve investigator appointments and Board proceedings, but no costs are estimated in the bill. Data unavailable.
  • Potential fine revenues (up to $100,000 per day per offence) depend on enforcement outcomes. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• The ban on replacement workers levels bargaining power and reduces the ability to continue production during a strike, which they say can lead to faster, good‑faith settlements (s. 94(2.1)-(2.3)).
• The 90‑day application to the Board offers a structured way to end prolonged disputes once assisted bargaining has failed, giving both sides a clear backstop (Division V.01).
• Safety and conservation exceptions allow essential tasks to continue, limiting risks to people, property, and the environment (s. 94(2.2)-(2.3)).
• Strong, per‑day fines and Board orders create real deterrence against unlawful use of replacement workers, supporting compliance without lengthy court battles (s. 99(1)(b.3); s. 100(5)).
• Guaranteed reinstatement protects strikers from being displaced by temporary hires, supporting stable return‑to‑work conditions (s. 87.6).

Opponents' View#

• The broad ban, including on contractors and other employees, could make it harder to maintain essential operations and may lengthen or increase the impact of strikes on services (s. 94(2.1)(b)-(c)). This assumes parties do not settle faster.
• The “conservation only” limit may be unclear in practice, leading to disputes over what tasks are allowed and added litigation or enforcement actions (s. 94(2.2)-(2.3)).
• Fines up to $100,000 per day create high financial risk for employers, including for inadvertent breaches, and could pressure quick decisions rather than careful compliance (s. 100(5)).
• Investigator entry and assistance powers may disrupt operations and raise privacy or procedural concerns, especially during tense labour disputes (s. 94(2.5)-(2.10)).
• Letting the Board settle agreements after 90 days could shift bargaining from the workplace to the tribunal, strain Board capacity, and produce outcomes less tailored to specific workplaces (Division V.01).