Conduct of Undercover Policing and Surveillance Operatives Bill [HL]

Summary#

The Conduct of Undercover Policing and Surveillance Operatives Bill [HL] would create a new law, rather than amend a named Act. Its stated goal is to prohibit covert human intelligence sources (CHIS: people used covertly to gather or provide information) from having intimate sexual relationships with people who are the subject of surveillance or investigation.

The supplied text is incomplete, so some powers and duties cannot be fully described. The supplied status says the bill is at committee stage in the House of Lords; it is not law, and passage is uncertain.

  • It would make it an offence for a CHIS to enter into or maintain an intimate sexual relationship with a person who is the subject of surveillance or investigation.
  • The authorities named include police forces, the National Crime Agency, Serious Fraud Office, Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ, His Majesty’s forces, HM Revenue and Customs, and any other government agency or body.
  • The bill includes a duty to monitor and a duty of candour and assistance (a duty to be open and help). The supplied text does not include enough wording to say exactly what these duties require or who must do what.
  • It provides for possible anonymity orders for a CHIS charged with the offence while acting for the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ. The supplied text lists possible measures such as withholding identifying details, allowing a pseudonym, or screening the defendant.
  • It includes a provision about how the offence interacts with section 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, but the supplied text does not show what that provision says.

What it means for you#

  • CHIS operatives: The bill would criminalise the specified sexual relationships. The supplied text does not show the penalty, any exceptions, or how “intimate sexual relationship” is defined.
  • People subject to surveillance or investigation: The bill does not appear to make you liable for the CHIS’s conduct. The supplied text does not establish a new right, complaint process, or compensation scheme for you.
  • Named authorities and other government bodies: The bill includes monitoring and candour-and-assistance duties, but the incomplete text does not show their exact scope. It does not provide enough information to say how the duties would apply in practice.
  • Defendants in some cases: Anonymity or screening may be available for a CHIS charged with the offence when acting for one of the three named intelligence agencies. The supplied text does not show who decides an application or all the conditions for an order.
  • Surveillance powers: The supplied material does not show that the bill creates or changes general surveillance powers.

Money#

No publicly available information.

  • The bill includes a duty to monitor, which may require agency resources, but the supplied text does not set out the duty fully or estimate its cost.
  • No information is provided on penalties, enforcement costs, or funding.

What is unclear#

  • The supplied bill text is incomplete. The offence’s penalty and any exceptions are not shown.
  • The bill uses “intimate sexual relationship,” but the supplied material does not include its definition.
  • The exact content of the monitoring and candour-and-assistance duties is missing.
  • The criteria and decision process for anonymity orders are not fully shown.
  • The bill refers to section 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, but the Act and the bill’s full interaction provision were not supplied. The effect on current law cannot be verified.
  • It is unclear how “any other government agency or body” would be applied.

Case for#

  • A possible argument for the bill is that it sets a clear criminal-law boundary against sexual relationships between covert operatives and people they are investigating or surveilling.
  • The bill applies that boundary across a broad list of public authorities, rather than limiting it to one police or intelligence service.
  • Anonymity and screening orders may help protect the safety of a defendant or another person, where the legal conditions are met.

Case against#

  • The supplied text does not show the offence’s penalty, the definition of the prohibited relationship, or any exceptions. Those details are central to knowing how the ban would work.
  • The bill names many authorities, including a catch-all for other government bodies, but the supplied material does not explain how the duties would operate across them.
  • Anonymity orders could limit public identification of some defendants. The supplied text does not show the full safeguards or decision process.
  • Without the complete text, it is unclear how the bill’s offence would interact with existing sexual-offence law or current rules for undercover operations.