New long-term investment fund proposed

Summary#

HB-164, the Wyoming generational investment account, failed and is not law. It would have created a new state investment account in Wyoming law and amended existing state investment and budget provisions. Its apparent goal was to invest state money for the long term and send some earnings to state accounts after a 20-fiscal-year wait.

  • The state auditor would have had to transfer up to $100 million each July from the legislative stabilization reserve account, while keeping that account’s unexpended, unobligated balance at or above $1 billion. Other transfers and appropriations required by law would come first.
  • The state treasurer would have invested the new account. The state loan and investment board would have had to seek preservation of the balance and strong risk-adjusted returns consistent with safety and liquidity.
  • The account’s overall investment risk could not materially exceed that of a reference portfolio of 85% private equity and 15% private credit. This is a risk benchmark, not a required allocation. The treasurer or a properly registered designee could invest the account’s unobligated, unencumbered balance in equities, including corporate stocks.
  • The annual transfer amounts could not be withdrawn. Starting 20 fiscal years after each transfer, earnings attributed to it would be distributed: half to the general fund and half to the legislative stabilization reserve account.
  • The bill would have excluded those earnings transfers from the total of the governor’s recommended appropriations. It would not itself have created a new benefit, tax, or fee.

What it means for you#

  • Taxpayers and the public: If the bill had become law, state money could have been set aside for long-term investment instead of remaining available for other state uses. The reserve-account balance condition would have limited the required annual transfer.
  • State officials: The state auditor would have had to make the transfers, and the treasurer would have had to invest the account and separately track earnings from each annual transfer.
  • People relying on state budgets: The bill would have directed half of the eligible earnings to the general fund and half to the reserve account after the wait. It does not say how the general fund’s share would be spent.
  • The bill would not have guaranteed a particular investment return or required the state to invest exactly 85% in private equity and 15% in private credit.

Money#

The bill would have required annual transfers of up to $100 million from the legislative stabilization reserve account, but no cost estimate is available in the supplied material.

  • The transfer could be less than $100 million—or unavailable—if needed to keep the reserve account’s unexpended, unobligated balance from falling below $1 billion.
  • The state auditor, treasurer, and investment board would have had duties under the bill, but no staffing or administrative cost estimate is provided.
  • Investment earnings would have been split between the general fund and the reserve account once eligible. The bill does not estimate those future earnings.

What is unclear#

  • The supplied material does not include the full current law. I could not verify all existing rules affected by the bill or how the new account would interact with other state investment accounts.
  • The bill does not explain what counts as “materially” exceeding the reference portfolio’s risk profile.
  • It does not set out detailed investment decision rules, reporting requirements, or a process for oversight of the account’s investments.
  • The bill defines investment earnings to include “returned capital,” but does not explain how that would be identified or accounted for.
  • The bill says the account is intended as a permanent or perpetual trust, subject to its withdrawal rules, but does not explain how money appropriated to the account other than the specified annual transfers could be withdrawn.

Case for#

  • The account would have been designed to invest state money over a long period, with distributions delayed for 20 fiscal years after each annual transfer.
  • The $1 billion reserve-account floor and priority for other legally required transfers would have limited how much could be moved.
  • A possible argument for the approach is that separating and tracking each transfer’s earnings could make it clearer which earnings are available for later distribution.

Case against#

  • One concern is that long-term investments can limit access to money when the state may need it; the bill says the annual transfer amounts cannot be withdrawn.
  • The bill allows an investment risk benchmark based on private equity and private credit, but does not explain the detailed investment choices or how risk would be assessed.
  • The bill would have redirected up to $100 million a year from the reserve account, reducing the money left there even when the minimum-balance condition allowed a transfer.
  • It is unclear what oversight and public reporting would apply to the account, and what would happen if its investments lost value.