data use restrictions for security agencies

Full Title:
No TSA Data for ICE Act

Summary#

This bill would add a new rule to the Homeland Security Act that limits how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can use certain passenger data and protects certain trusted-traveler enrollments from being changed for First Amendment activity. The main change is twofold: (1) the Secretary of DHS may not access or use certain Transportation Security Administration (TSA) data or certain brokered passenger data to carry out CBP or ICE functions; and (2) the Secretary may not deny, suspend, or end someone’s enrollment in several Trusted Traveler programs because of the person’s participation in activity protected by the First Amendment (free speech, peaceful assembly, etc.). The bill names several Trusted Traveler programs (PreCheck, Global Entry, SENTRI, FAST, NEXUS, and the APEC Business Travel Card).

Key points:

  • Prohibits the Secretary of DHS from accessing or using “specified information” (defined as TSA information and passenger-identifying data from private data brokers) to perform functions of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
  • Explicitly mentions “indirect means” such as the Mobile Fortify app as covered methods of access or use.
  • Prevents denial, suspension, or early termination of enrollment in listed Trusted Traveler programs on the basis of participation in First Amendment-protected activity.
  • Adds this rule as a new section to Title VII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

What it means for you#

  • Air travelers / passengers: Your personally identifiable flight data that comes from TSA or from private firms that broker passenger data would be covered by the ban on DHS access or use for CBP or ICE functions. The bill does not describe how existing passenger-screening or law-enforcement uses that rely on other data sources would change.
  • Trusted Traveler program members and applicants (PreCheck, Global Entry, SENTRI, FAST, NEXUS, APEC Business Travel Card): Agencies could not deny, suspend, or end your enrollment in these programs because you took part in activity protected by the First Amendment (for example, lawful protests or public speech), according to the bill text.
  • DHS agencies (CBP and ICE) and TSA: These agencies would face new limits on using TSA-origin data and brokered passenger PII for CBP/ICE work. The bill would require change in how DHS handles certain data flows, but it does not detail operational steps.
  • Private data brokers and companies: Data brokers that collect and sell passenger-identifying information would be affected indirectly because DHS could not access or use their data for CBP/ICE functions. The bill does not ban the market for such data.
  • Law enforcement, immigration enforcement, and border operations: These activities could be constrained where they rely on the specific types of information the bill bars DHS from using. The bill does not say which enforcement activities are or are not allowed when other data sources are used.

Expenses#

No publicly available information.

  • The bill text and the provided material do not include a fiscal note, cost estimate, or budget analysis.
  • Possible consequences the bill does not quantify: changes to IT systems or data-sharing agreements, staff time to separate or block covered data sources, and potential legal or policy work to implement the First Amendment protection for Trusted Traveler adjudications. These are reasonable implementation items to expect but are not estimated in the available material.

Proponents' View#

The bill appears intended to protect certain passenger data from being used for immigration or enforcement actions and to protect political and expressive activity from affecting trusted-traveler access. Possible supporting arguments that follow directly from the bill text include:

  • The bill appears intended to keep TSA-originating information and brokered passenger PII from being used by CBP or ICE, which could be seen as limiting law-enforcement use of routine travel data.
  • The bill could be seen as protecting civil liberties by ensuring that lawful participation in protests, speech, or similar First Amendment activities cannot be used as a reason to remove or deny Trusted Traveler benefits.
  • The explicit mention of indirect access methods (for example, certain apps) suggests an intent to close loopholes where data could reach enforcement agencies through third parties.

Opponents' View#

The bill text leaves some practical and legal questions open. Possible concerns based on the bill’s wording include:

  • One concern is that the bill does not clearly define the full scope of “access” or “utilize,” which could create uncertainty about what specific uses by DHS, contractors, or other federal partners are allowed or forbidden.
  • The bill may limit tools CBP or ICE use for investigations, national security, or immigration enforcement if those activities currently rely on TSA data or brokered passenger PII; the bill does not describe alternative data sources or workarounds.
  • It is unclear how agencies would decide whether a particular activity is protected by the First Amendment for the purpose of Trusted Traveler decisions. The bill does not set procedures for making that determination, for resolving disputes, or for handling cases where expressive activity overlaps with criminal conduct.
  • The bill does not address how it would interact with other legal obligations or existing data-sharing agreements. That could raise questions about compliance, legal conflict, or the need to renegotiate contracts.
  • Administrative costs and operational disruption are possible but not estimated in the provided material.