Kids Online Safety Act

Full Title:
Kids Online Safety Act

Summary#

This bill, the Kids Online Safety Act, sets new rules for online services that are used by children and teenagers. It requires platforms to give default safeguards for minors, parental controls, annual transparency reports (for large platforms), limits on marketing and research aimed at children, and an option for users to see unmanipulated (non-personalized) content. The Federal Trade Commission would enforce the law and a new Kids Online Safety Council would advise Congress.

  • Main change: Platforms must exercise a “duty of care” to prevent certain foreseeable harms to minors and must provide safeguards and parental tools that are protective by default.
  • Platforms that average more than 10 million U.S. monthly users must commission independent third‑party audits and publish annual transparency reports about minors’ use.
  • Platforms may not do market/product research on users they know are children, and they must not advertise certain restricted products (drugs, alcohol, tobacco, gambling) to users they know are minors.
  • Large platforms that use opaque (personalized) algorithms must notify users and let them switch to an input‑transparent (non‑user-data‑based) algorithm.
  • The bill orders a government study on device‑level age verification methods and requires FTC guidance for implementation.
  • Most of Title I starts 18 months after enactment; the filter‑bubble (algorithm) rule starts 1 year after enactment.

What it means for you#

  • Parents

    • Platforms must give tools parents can use by default for children the platform knows are under 13. These tools include managing privacy settings, limiting purchases, and viewing or restricting time spent.
    • Parents must be given notice and verifiable consent when the platform treats an account as belonging to a child.

  • Children and teens

    • If a platform knows an account is a minor, the default settings must be the most protective option the platform offers (unless a parent enables different settings).
    • Minors can be given a clear option to opt out of personalized recommendation systems and to limit features that encourage longer use (like autoplay or infinite scroll).

  • Online platforms and app makers

    • Covered platforms must design safeguards for minors, offer parental tools, provide reporting tools for harms to minors, and make clear disclosures about recommendation systems and advertising.
    • Platforms averaging >10 million U.S. monthly users must undergo independent audits and publish annual reports about minors’ use and the platform’s safeguards.
    • Platforms may not conduct market/product research on users they know are children without verifiable parental consent.
    • Platforms that use opaque algorithms must give clear notices and let users switch to a non‑personalized (input‑transparent) algorithm, and cannot charge users more for that choice.

  • Advertisers and marketers

    • Platforms must not facilitate advertising of narcotics, tobacco, alcohol, gambling, or cannabis products to users they know are minors.
    • Advertising presented to minors must include clear labels indicating it is paid content or endorsements.

  • Schools, libraries, and education services

    • Many schools, preschools, libraries, and higher‑education institutions are excluded from the broad definition of “covered platform,” or have special rules when a platform is acting on behalf of an educational agency.

  • Law enforcement and states

    • The FTC enforces the federal rules. State attorneys general can also sue over certain sections but must notify the FTC and have some limits when the FTC is already acting.

Expenses#

No publicly available information.

  • The bill requires independent third‑party audits and annual reports for large platforms. This could mean added audit and reporting costs for platforms that meet the size test.
  • Platforms may need to build or change parental controls, opt‑out mechanisms, reporting systems, and product features, which could raise development and operating costs.
  • Enforcement and litigation could create additional legal and administrative costs for platforms and for the FTC and state offices; the bill does not include a cost estimate or fiscal note in the supplied material.
  • The required government study on device‑level age verification could lead to later policy or technology costs if the study recommends systems that platforms adopt.

Proponents' View#

The bill appears intended to reduce foreseeable harms to children online and increase accountability. Possible arguments for the bill based on its text include:

  • The bill appears intended to protect minors from specific harms (eating disorders, substance misuse, suicidal behavior, severe harassment, sexual exploitation, and financial harms linked to deceptive practices).
  • Requiring default protective settings and parental tools could make online experiences safer for children without relying on parents to find and enable protections.
  • Transparency reports and independent audits for large platforms could increase accountability about how minors use services and how platforms design features that encourage use.
  • Letting users switch off opaque, personalized recommendation systems could reduce algorithmic amplification and let people see content in a less tailored way.
  • Prohibiting market research on known children and restricting targeted ads for certain products aims to limit commercial exploitation of minors.

Opponents' View#

The bill contains elements that raise practical or legal questions based on its design and the text supplied.

  • The definition of “covered platform” is broad. It could create uncertainty about which services are covered, which may push platforms to collect more age data or to restrict features to avoid liability.
  • The standard that platforms must act where harm is “reasonably foreseeable” and where the platform “knows” a user is a minor depends on how “know” is interpreted. The bill directs the FTC to issue guidance, but uncertainty until guidance arrives could lead platforms to over‑collect data or take conservative measures.
  • Independent audits require platforms to give third parties access to data, networks, and systems. That raises questions about protecting user privacy, business confidential information, and cybersecurity. The bill bars disclosure of trade secrets and privileged information, but practical limits are not detailed.
  • The filter‑bubble rule requires platforms to let users switch to an input‑transparent algorithm. Implementing a usable non‑personalized alternative and the interface to switch could be technically hard and could affect product function or user experience.
  • Enforcement by both the FTC and state attorneys general creates the possibility of parallel or duplicative litigation. The bill includes notice and intervention procedures but does not eliminate the risk of conflicts.
  • The bill orders a study of device‑level age verification but does not require such systems. Age verification raises privacy concerns and could create barriers to access if later adopted; the bill directs study of privacy and accessibility but leaves outcomes uncertain.
  • No fiscal estimates or implementation timelines for many technical tasks are included in the supplied material, so the scale of costs and resources needed is unclear.

What is unclear: The supplied material does not include a fiscal note, cost estimates, or detailed guidance on how auditors will access data while protecting privacy and trade secrets. The practical rules the FTC will use to decide when a platform “knows” an account is a minor are to be provided later in guidance.