Summary#
The United States Submarine Cable Security Policy Act of 2026 would amend the Cable Landing License Act, which governs licenses to land or operate submarine cables in the United States. It would give the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) a central role in licensing and require new security rules. The bill’s stated goal is to identify and address possible security concerns involving submarine cables; that goal is not a guaranteed result. The bill was introduced and referred to a House committee, so it is not law and may not pass.
- A committee that reviews foreign participation in U.S. telecommunications would have to develop a security policy within 180 days of enactment. The FCC would then have to adopt standard security measures and enhanced measures for cases where standard measures do not address a national-security risk.
- The FCC would have to require applicable security measures as a license condition. License holders would have to comply, and the FCC would enforce violations as violations of the Communications Act.
- The bill would set application deadlines: generally 20 days for the FCC to say whether an application is accepted for filing, then 45 days to approve or deny it. If referred to the committee for review, the decision deadline would be one year. Missing the deadline would generally mean the application is accepted for filing or approved, as applicable.
- Committee review would be limited to specified cases, including applicants seeking to overcome certain foreign-adversary disqualifying conditions. Some applicants could certify ownership information and whether standard or enhanced measures apply.
- Some applicants could land a cable while an application is pending, after giving notice and waiting 20 days. This would not let them operate the cable except to construct and test it. A committee objection blocks landing only if the FCC concurs, including by being deemed to concur if it does not respond as required.
- The bill would limit security conditions outside the standard or enhanced measures. It would also let some existing licensees ask to replace a security agreement with applicable standard or enhanced measures.
What it means for you#
- Cable applicants and license holders: They would face security requirements set by the FCC. Some could qualify for a faster or more limited review through self-certification; the bill does not guarantee that every applicant could do so.
- The FCC: It would have to write and enforce licensing and security rules, decide applications within set periods, and take part in certain committee objections to early cable landing.
- The committee: It would have to develop the policy and could review only applications meeting the bill’s stated referral conditions. For additional security measures beyond the standard or enhanced sets, it would have to petition the FCC, which must find that the measures address an otherwise unaddressed national-security risk.
- The public: The bill does not directly change household internet service, create a public benefit, or impose a tax or fee.
- Current law: The supplied materials do not include the Cable Landing License Act as it currently reads, so the full change from current law could not be checked. The bill text does specify changes to licensing authority and process.
Money#
No cost information is in the available material.
- The bill requires the committee and FCC to develop policies and rules, and requires the FCC to enforce security measures, but gives no staffing or cost estimate.
- It creates no stated tax, fee, fine amount, or appropriation.
What is unclear#
- The bill does not spell out the security measures. The FCC would set them through rules, based in part on the committee’s recommendations.
- It does not define key terms such as “material, non-pro forma changes” or set out how the FCC would decide that a national-security risk is not addressed by standard measures.
- The bill does not detail how the committee would review referred applications or how the public and interested parties would take part beyond seeking and considering input for the policy.
- The text does not explain how the new process would interact with other existing licensing or security requirements.
- The bill’s application rules would apply once all required rules take effect. The timing of those rules is not certain.
Case for#
- A possible argument for the bill is that submarine cable security would be addressed through standard rules rather than separate security agreements for each license.
- Set decision deadlines could make licensing times more predictable. The longer deadline for referred cases leaves more time for national-security review.
- Enhanced measures could address risks that standard measures do not cover.
- Limited early landing authority could let some cable construction proceed while a license application is pending, without allowing ordinary operation before the license is issued.
Case against#
- The bill leaves important security decisions to later FCC rules, so applicants would not know from the bill what measures they must meet.
- Deemed approval could result if the FCC misses a deadline, and some applicants could land cables before receiving a license. These timelines may limit the time available for review.
- Self-certification and restricted committee referrals could reduce individualized review in some cases; the bill does not fully explain how eligibility would be determined.
- The bill requires new rulemaking and enforcement work but provides no cost or staffing estimate.