Nuclear Export Diplomacy

Summary#

This bill creates a new program at the Department of State called the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST). The program is meant to promote the responsible international deployment of civil nuclear energy, especially small modular reactors (SMRs), and to support U.S. businesses that supply related technology and services. The bill requires an initial report and regular briefings to two congressional committees and ends (sunsets) on June 8, 2034.

Key changes:

• Creates the FIRST program inside the State Department, led by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (or a designee).
• Directs the program to promote U.S. civil nuclear projects abroad and push for high safety, security, and nonproliferation standards.
• Authorizes diplomatic outreach, technical and regulatory consultations, early-stage commercial project support (feasibility and engineering studies), and training/cooperation with partner countries.
• Requires a report within 120 days and triannual briefings to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; report is unclassified with an optional classified annex.
• Allows reporting of funds used, including funds drawn from Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) and related State Department funding sources.
• Sunsets the program on June 8, 2034.

What it means for you#

• U.S. businesses in civil nuclear / SMR sectors

  • The State Department would actively promote U.S.-made SMR technology and services abroad.
  • Companies could get early-stage support such as feasibility or engineering studies that may help start export projects.

• Foreign governments / partner countries considering SMRs

  • They could receive diplomatic engagement, advice on licensing and regulatory frameworks, training, and help coordinating technical standards.
  • Partner countries may see U.S. offers of technical cooperation tied to safety, security, and nonproliferation standards.

• Department of State staff

  • The Under Secretary’s office will manage the program and carry out outreach, technical consultations, and project support.
  • Staff time, diplomatic engagement, and program management responsibilities are implied.

• Congress

  • The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee will receive an initial report within 120 days and then regular briefings on the program’s activities and funding.

• General public / taxpayers

  • The bill could lead to more U.S. government activity abroad related to nuclear energy promotion and related technical assistance. The bill does not directly change domestic regulation or licensing of reactors.

Expenses#

No publicly available information.

• The bill does not specify new appropriations or a funding amount.
• The text requires reporting on funds used and explicitly mentions that activities may use NADR and related State Department funding sources, which suggests existing program funds could be used.
• Likely cost categories (not quantified in the bill): staff time, diplomatic travel, technical studies (feasibility/engineering), training programs, and possible contractor costs.
• It is unclear whether Congress would approve additional funding or the program would operate within current State Department budgets.

Proponents' View#

• The bill appears intended to promote safe and secure use of civil nuclear technology abroad while supporting U.S. economic and national security interests.
• Supporters may argue the program could help U.S. companies win contracts for SMR projects by providing early commercial support and diplomatic advocacy.
• The program could improve global safety, security, and nonproliferation by making these standards central to export and deployment decisions.
• Coordinated training, regulatory advice, and shared technical standards could make international SMR deployments smoother and more consistent.

Opponents' View#

• One concern is that the bill does not specify funding levels and relies on existing accounts (including NADR), raising questions about trade-offs between nonproliferation goals and commercial promotion.
• The bill gives limited detail on how the program will measure success or guard against conflicts between promoting exports and nonproliferation safeguards.
• It is unclear whether the program creates new authority or simply reassigns existing State Department duties, which affects estimates of added costs and staffing needs.
• The term “triannual” for ongoing briefings is ambiguous (could mean three times a year or every three years); the bill does not clarify the intended frequency.
• The bill lists broad activities (diplomacy, technical support, standards coordination) but lacks detail on how partners are chosen, what safeguards will be required, or how assistance will be phased into actual projects.