Surveillance Limits for US Persons

Summary#

The bill would change the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and rules about intelligence under Executive Order 12333 to block the use of foreign-intelligence authorities to target or gather information about “United States persons.” It would also bar the government from using information about a United States person gathered under those authorities in criminal, civil, or administrative cases or investigations. The bill allows a United States person who was targeted (an “aggrieved person”) to use information about themselves in legal proceedings.

• Main change: Bars FISA orders and certain intelligence activity from being used to surveil, search, or collect records about United States persons (as defined in FISA).
• Search/query limits: Prohibits queries of Section 702-collected data using search terms associated with a United States person.
• Evidence rule: Forbids the government from using information concerning a United States person that was acquired or “derived” from FISA or EO 12333 collection in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding or investigation.
• Exception for individuals: A United States person who was targeted or whose communications were surveilled may use such information about themselves in court or an investigation.
• Rule of construction: The bill says it does not change Supreme Court rules about Fourth Amendment exceptions (for example, exigent circumstances).

What it means for you#

• United States persons (citizens, lawful permanent residents, many U.S. organizations):

  • The bill would try to stop the use of FISA and EO 12333 authorities to surveil or gather information about you.
  • Information about you collected under those authorities generally could not be used by the government in prosecutions, civil suits, or administrative cases.
  • If you were the target or your communications were surveilled, you could use that information yourself in court.

• People targeted as non‑U.S. persons abroad:

  • The bill does not say it changes targeting of non‑U.S. persons. It does limit government queries and use of information when the data involve a United States person.

• Law enforcement and intelligence agencies:

  • They would be barred from asking the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for orders to surveil a United States person under FISA.
  • They could not query FISA Section 702 data using U.S.-person search terms.
  • For EO 12333 collection, the bill says statutory tools or criminal-procedure rules must be the only way to acquire content or records when the target is a United States person.

• Courts and prosecutors:

  • The government generally could not introduce or use evidence about a United States person that comes from FISA or EO 12333 collection or that is “derived” from that collection.
  • Victims or targets who are United States persons could introduce such material themselves.

• Businesses and third parties (telecoms, cloud providers):

  • The bill does not create new production orders for them. It restricts intelligence authorities from being used to obtain records about United States persons; how that affects cooperation with subpoenas or court orders is not spelled out.

Expenses#

No publicly available information.

• The bill text includes no fiscal note, cost estimates, or details about administrative expenses.
• It is not stated whether agencies would need new systems, training, or personnel to comply.
• It is not stated whether courts, agencies, or departments would lose or shift funding.

Proponents' View#

• The bill appears intended to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections by keeping foreign-intelligence authorities from being used to surveil U.S. persons.
• Supporters may argue this would prevent the government from using intelligence-collection tools as a way to bypass criminal-justice rules and warrants.
• Allowing an “aggrieved person” to use information about themselves could help people challenge surveillance or use evidence in their defense or claims.
• The rule of construction explicitly preserves existing Supreme Court exceptions (such as exigent circumstances), which may be intended to avoid blocking emergency actions allowed under the Fourth Amendment.

Opponents' View#

• One concern is that the bill could restrict tools that intelligence and law enforcement currently rely on to find threats when U.S. persons are involved, possibly making some investigations harder.
• The bill does not clearly say how agencies should handle situations where collection aimed at a non‑U.S. person incidentally captures a U.S. person’s communications. It does forbid using information “concerning a United States person” and defines “derived,” but practical limits are unclear.
• It is unclear how the changes would interact with other statutes, court orders, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when both intelligence and criminal investigations overlap.
• The bill offers no cost or implementation plan, so questions remain about administrative burdens, data-handling changes, and how agencies would prevent or detect prohibited queries.
• The text preserves certain Fourth Amendment exceptions but does not detail how they apply in intelligence contexts; that could leave open disputes about when surveillance or searches are allowed in emergencies.